Audits or Distortions: The Optimal Scheme to Enforce Self-Employment Income Taxes

Eduardo Zilberman
Department of Economics
New York University
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Abstract

I investigate the optimal auditing mechanism for a net revenue maximizer tax collection agency that in addition to reported profits, it also observes the level of employment at each firm. Each firm is managed and owned by a single entrepreneur. Firms’ productivity is heterogeneous as managerial ability is random. Since auditing probabilities depend on employment, labor decisions are distorted. The optimal auditing scheme and corresponding labor schedule are discontinuous and non-monotone in ability. In intermediate audit costs, the less productive entrepreneurs face auditing probabilities that increase with their managerial ability, whereas the ablest ones are not audited. A quantitative exploration suggests that if the optimal auditing scheme was adopted in practice, net revenue would increase by at least 59%.

Keywords: optimal auditing, tax evasion, entrepreneurship, mechanism design.

JEL Classification: D21, H26.

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1 Introduction

The optimal income tax enforcement literature\(^1\) has mostly focused on individual taxpayers whose income is either exogenous or solely remunerates labor supply.\(^2\) However, Slemrod [2007] reports that in the U.S., due to third-party reporting, only 1 percent of wages and salaries are underreported to the tax collection agency (henceforth the IRS). In contrast, 43 percent of individual business income, which is mostly self-reported, is underreported.\(^3\)

Hence, given that wages taxes are practically enforced, the number of workers at each firm seems to be easily observable by the IRS. This paper asks the following: given that, in addition to reported income, employment at each firm is also observable, how should a net revenue maximizer IRS monitor heterogeneous entrepreneurs?\(^4\) In particular, the source of heterogeneity is a random managerial ability.

By conditioning its monitoring strategy on employment, the IRS also indirectly distorts labor input to enforce taxes. As a result, employment is distorted in almost every firm. Moreover, if the cost to audit is not too high, the less productive entrepreneurs face auditing probabilities that increase with their managerial ability, whereas the ablest ones are not audited. At some threshold level of ability, the monitoring strategy discontinuously drops. Hence, the optimal auditing scheme and labor schedule are not monotone in ability.

In Section 2, I introduce a variant of Bigio and Zilberman [forthcoming]'s two stage game to study optimal self-employment income tax enforcement. A self-employed is a risk-neutral entrepreneur who owns and manages a single firm. In particular, an entrepreneur experiences a random managerial ability, also her privately observed type, that enhances productivity in a plant exhibiting decreasing returns to scale. Production is carried out by a team of workers. Entrepreneurs can underreport income, that is the profits generated by their own firms, in order to evade taxes. If a firm is audited, true income is uncovered, and the entrepreneur

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\(^1\) The seminal paper is Reinganum and Wilde [1985], which is inspired by the costly state verification model of Townsend [1979]. Notable contributions are Border and Sobel [1987], Mookherjee and Png [1989], Cremer et al. [1990], Sánchez and Sobel [1993], Cremer and Gahvari [1996], Macho-Stadler and Pérez-Castrillo [1997], Chander and Wilde [1998], and Bassetto and Phelan [2008]. The first theoretical work on tax noncompliance is Allingham and Sandmo [1972], which builds on the work of Becker [1968] on the economics of crime. Recent surveys are Andreoni et al. [1998], Slemrod and Yitzhaki [2002], and Sandmo [2005].

\(^2\) A recent exception is Parker [2010], who introduces entrepreneurship and dynamic incentives in a two-period model. Armenter and Mertens [2010] and Ravikumar and Zhang [2010] also study the role of audits in a dynamic environment.

\(^3\) These figures account for 10 and 109 billion dollars, respectively. Kleven et al. [2010], for instance, define the tax evasion rate as the share of reported income that is underreported. Using data from Denmark, they estimate it as being 8.1% for self-employment income, 0.4% for earnings, 0.3% for third-party reported income, and 37% for self-reported income.

\(^4\) In this paper, firms and entrepreneurs make up a single unit. Henceforth, I use both terms interchangeably.
who owns this firm must pay a penalty.

In the first stage, given the managerial ability distribution, the IRS commits to a costly monitoring strategy dependent on both reported income and labor input, assumed to be costlessly observable. In the second stage, firms take into account this monitoring strategy and choose labor input and reported income. Hence, labor is not only a factor input, but also a signal of the true income. At a production cost, labor can be strategically distorted to signal a lower income to the IRS.

To solve this model, I follow a mechanism design approach, in which the choice of labor and reported income are delegated to the IRS. Due to the revelation principle, it is enough to focus within the class of direct mechanisms that respect incentive compatibility and individual rationality. That is, an agent reports her type (i.e., her managerial ability) and is then assigned a labor input to employ, an amount to report as profits, and a probability she is audited with. The mechanism is designed such that agents report truthfully their types, and derive at least their reservation values.

Since an entrepreneur can always declare her true profits and pay the right amount of taxes, her reservation value is the post-tax truthfully declared profits, which is increasing in the managerial ability. This type-dependent reservation value generates countervailing incentives. That is, on the one hand, an entrepreneur is willing to understate her type in order to pay less taxes. On the other hand, she is willing to overstate her type in order to be assigned a higher reservation value. In this specific environment, the incentives to understate (overstate) are stronger for high-ability (low-ability) types. Therefore, as audits are also designed to deter type misreport, countervailing incentives are one of the driving forces that make the optimal auditing scheme not monotone in ability.

The other driving force is the joint condition of the monitoring strategy on both reported income and labor input. If it depends only on reported income, a non-increasing monitoring strategy is necessary to verify incentive compatibility. If it is also conditioned on labor input, this requirement is relaxed. In Sections 3 and 4.1, I discuss this result in details.

If employment at each firm is unobservable, the model presented in this paper collapses to a variant of the one in Sánchez and Sobel [1993]. In this context, the optimal monitoring strategy is a cut-off rule. Every entrepreneur below a certain threshold type is audited with constant intensity, whereas those above it are not monitored at all. In equilibrium, only low-ability entrepreneurs report income honestly, while high-ability entrepreneurs report the income of the threshold type. Consequently, the richest entrepreneurs evade proportionally more, introducing a regressive bias in the effective tax rate.

If labor input is observable, on top of audits, the IRS can also use labor distortions to provide incentives and enforce taxes. The solution to this problem has the following
properties: (1) as in a standard mechanism design problem, the top-type is not distorted; (2) in the top range of the type distribution, audits are never used, and labor is distorted downwards to prevent high-ability entrepreneurs from understating their types; (3) below some threshold type, stronger incentives for entrepreneurs to overstate their types, and be assigned a higher reservation value, limit the further use of distortions to provide incentives. Individual rationality binds in this region; (4) if the audit cost is too high, only labor distortions are used to provide incentives; (5) if the audit cost is not too high, audits and labor distortions are optimally combined to enforce taxes. In the bottom range of the type distribution, both the optimal monitoring strategy and labor schedule are increasing in ability. At the threshold type, they drop discontinuously; (6) every entrepreneur reports dishonestly; Finally, (7) the effective tax rate is higher in the middle of the type distribution, thus the overall regressive (or progressive) bias that arises from evasion is unknown.

The role of costly audits as a tool to maximize government revenue is twofold: First, it enforces taxes from those that are audited; Second, it provides incentives by preventing misreport from other types, which allows the IRS to require higher income declarations from them. Similarly, labor distortions can be used to provide incentives, but only at a production cost that diminishes revenue collection. The optimal mechanism balances the use of these two tools in a way that preserves incentive compatibility and individual rationality, and also maximizes net revenue collection.

In Section 4, I present an example that summarizes the intuition behind these results, which are analytically derived in Section 5. In Section 6, I discuss some generalizations to the model.

On the technical side, this paper solves a mechanism design problem with two choice variables that goes beyond quasi-linearity, and features type-dependent individual constraints. Moreover, the solution method accounts for the presence of discontinuities.

In Section 7, I explore quantitatively the implications of this mechanism. In particular, I establish a lower bound to the net revenue increase if the mechanism developed in this paper was counterfactually adopted. Under the assumption that the U.S. is a “relatively free-distortion” competitive economy, I use data on employment and entrepreneurship from the Survey of Consumer Finance to impose some discipline on the managerial ability distribution.

Results suggest that once adopted, the optimal mechanism can substantially increase revenue and reduce evasion in comparison with the U.S. data. In particular, among nonfarm sole-proprietors, for a conservative choice of parameters, revenue collection increases by at least 59%, and the fraction of reported income is at least 86%, as opposed to 43% documented

\[5\text{By relatively free-distortion, I mean an economy in which policies do not target the firm size. By competitive, I mean an economy in which entrepreneurs take prices as given and maximize expected profits.}\]
in Slemrod [2007]. Section 8 concludes.

2 Model

I consider a two-stage game in which entrepreneurs remit taxes to the IRS. Taxes may be potentially evaded. In the first stage, the IRS commits to a monitoring strategy that depends both on observable labor input and reported income. In the second stage, firms take into account the monitoring strategy, and choose labor input and reported income.

There is a continuum of firms of measure one. Each firm is owned and managed by a single entrepreneur, who experiences a random managerial ability $z$, which is her privately observed type. I assume $z$ is independently and identically distributed according to $G$, with density $g = G'$ uniformly bounded away from zero, and compact support $[\underline{z}, \overline{z}]$ with $\underline{z} \geq 0$. I also assume $g$ is continuously differentiable.

There is a single good produced with a single observable input, labor $n$. The production technology is $zn^\alpha$, with $\alpha \in (0, 1)$ common to all firms. Let wages be the numeraire, and $p$ be the price of the good, thus pre-tax profits are $\pi(n, z) = pzn^\alpha - n$. Notice that the efficient level of employment is $n^*(z) = (apz)^{\frac{1}{1-\alpha}}$.

Decreasing returns to scale are important to generate positive profits in a competitive environment, otherwise the posed question would be trivial. This specific functional form is chosen for tractability. I discuss the consequences of adopting a more general production function in Section 6.1. In particular, I show that the production technology can be generalized to $zn^{\alpha_0} \prod_{i=1}^{I} k_i^{\alpha_i}$, with $\alpha_0 + \sum_{i=1}^{I} \alpha_i \in (0, 1)$ and $\alpha_i \geq 0$ for $i = 0, \ldots, I$, as long as only $n$ is observable. This generalization is important because it extends the scope in which the model can be applied. For example, even if unskilled labor can be hidden, the IRS might still observe skilled labor or any other input.

A profit tax rate, $\tau$, is imposed exogenously by the government. After observing her own type $z$, the entrepreneur decides how much labor to hire and income to report to the IRS. I denote reported profits by $x \geq 0$, so $\tau x$ is the amount paid out as taxes, and $\tau(\pi(n, z) - x)$ is the amount evaded by the entrepreneur. The IRS (the principal) costlessly observes labor $n$ and reported income $x$. However, it is able to observe ability $z$, and hence actual income, only if it audits the firm at a constant cost $c > 0$. If an entrepreneur is audited, she is assessed by $\max\{\mu \tau(\pi(n, z) - x), 0\}$, where $\mu > 1$ is a linear penalty on the amount evaded.\(^7\)

\(^6\)In some contexts, labor might not be readily observable. However, $n$ can be any other observable input factor, such as the physical capital of a plant, for example.

\(^7\)Implicitly, I assume all penalties are enforced even if $\mu \tau(\pi(n, z) - x) > \pi(n, z) - \tau x$, that is, penalties are higher than post-tax profits. If limited liability is a concern, I could assume that $\mu \in (1, \frac{1}{\tau})$, which is enough to guarantee penalties are payable only with post-tax profits.
Penalties are assumed to be linear for tractability, otherwise I would not be able to rewrite the IRS problem in terms of expected informational rents, a trick that simplifies the solution. Note that the IRS does not reward overreporting. Hence, without loss of generality, I restrict the set of reported income to be \([0, \pi(n, z)]\), and set \(\max\{\mu \tau(\pi(n, z) - x), 0\} = \mu \tau(\pi(n, z) - x)\).

In this paper, the IRS is an agency responsible only for auditing and collecting taxes. Choosing tax rates and penalties is beyond its scope.\(^8\) In particular, taxes would be fully enforced without cost if penalties were arbitrarily large, that is \(\mu \to \infty\). However, many authors argue that an abusive use of penalties is limited by other reasons, such as a common ethical norm,\(^9\) or more economically, to restrain the power of corruptible self-interested enforcers.\(^{10}\)

The IRS knows the distribution of firms, \(G\). In the first stage, in order to maximize expected net revenue, given \(G\), the IRS commits to a monitoring strategy, which is an audit probability function, \(\varphi(n, x)\), that depends both on employment and reported income.

As Andreoni et al. [1998] argue, assuming that the IRS objective is to maximize expected net revenue, instead of a welfare criteria, seems a reasonable positive description of how many tax agencies behave in practice. However, most tax agencies do not explicitly commit to a monitoring strategy that depends on available information. Hence, I justify this assumption on a normative ground. If net revenue collection is the main concern, as in periods of high budget deficits, the best the IRS can do is to commit to a monitoring strategy that depends on all costlessly observable variables.\(^{11}\)

In the second stage, given \(\varphi\), the entrepreneur’s problem is to maximize her expected profits:

\[
\max_{n \geq 0, x \in [0, \pi(n, z)]} \pi(n, z) - \tau x - \varphi(n, x) \mu \tau(\pi(n, z) - x).
\]

Notice that labor is not only a factor input, but also a signal of the true income. Hence, at a production cost, labor input can be strategically distorted to signal a lower income to the IRS.

Before proceeding with the analysis, I solve for the full-information case, that is, when \(z\) is observable. Let the monitoring strategy, also a function of \(z\) in this case, be denoted

\(^{8}\)These variables are usually chosen by other government spheres like the Treasury or Congress. For example, in August 2007, the U.S. Government Accountability Office (U.S. GAO) published a report (http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d071062.pdf) suggesting the Congress to require IRS to periodically adjust penalties for inflation.

\(^{9}\)Rosen [2005], for example, argues that “existing penalty systems try to incorporate just retribution. Contrary to the assumptions of the utilitarian framework, society cares not only about the end result (getting rid of the cheaters) but also the processes by which the result is achieved.”

\(^{10}\)See Polinsky and Shavell [2000] for a survey.

\(^{11}\)See Erard and Feinstein [1994] for a model in which the IRS does not commit to a monitoring strategy.
by \( \varphi^*(n, x, z) \). In the second stage, a firm \( z \) weakly prefers to declare its true profits \( \pi(n, z) \) rather than underreport \( x < \pi(n, z) \) whenever \( \varphi^*(n, x, z) \geq \frac{1}{\mu} \). Indeed, by comparing expected profits,

\[
(1 - \tau) \pi(n, z) \geq \pi(n, z) - \tau x - \varphi^*(n, x, z) \mu \tau (\pi(n, z) - x) \iff \varphi^*(n, x, z) \geq \frac{1}{\mu}.
\]

Similarly, the IRS weakly prefers that an entrepreneur \( z \) declares her true profits \( \pi(n, z) \) rather than underreports \( x < \pi(n, z) \) whenever it chooses \( \varphi^*(n, x, z) \leq \frac{1}{\mu} \) in the first stage. Indeed, by comparing expected revenue,

\[
\tau \pi(n, z) \geq \tau x + \varphi^*(n, x, z) \mu \tau (\pi(n, z) - x) \iff \varphi^*(n, x, z) \leq \frac{1}{\mu}.
\]

Hence, the best the IRS can do is to induce every entrepreneur \( z \) to produce efficiently and report her true profits \( \pi(n^*(z), z) \), without spending resources. This is achieved by the following monitoring strategy:

\[
\varphi^*(n, x, z) = \begin{cases}
\frac{1}{\mu} & \text{if } x \neq \pi(n^*(z), z) \text{ or } n \neq n^*(z) \\
0 & \text{otherwise}
\end{cases}.
\]

I use the superscript * to denote the full-information solution in order to highlight that it induces the efficient employment per firm. This mechanism works only through off-equilibrium threats. As long as the IRS commits to this monitoring technology, it enforces all taxes at no cost.

If the IRS does not observe \( z \), an adverse selection problem arises. In order to increase her expected profits, an entrepreneur may distort her labor decision and report less income. To solve this problem, I follow a mechanism design approach. By the revelation principle, it is enough to restrict attention to the class of direct mechanisms that respect incentive compatibility and individual rationality. That is, an agent reports her type, say \( \tilde{z} \), and is then assigned \( n(\tilde{z}), x(\tilde{z}), \phi(\tilde{z}) \), where \( \phi \) is the direct monitoring strategy, defined on \([\tilde{z}, \bar{z}]\). In particular, the mechanism is designed such that an entrepreneur reports truthfully her type, that is \( \tilde{z} = z \), and derives at least her reservation value. I assume that \( n, x, \phi \) are piecewise continuously differentiable functions of \( z \).

The idea is to solve for the optimal direct mechanism \( \{n(z), x(z), \phi(z)\}_z \), and then construct a mapping between \( \phi \) and \( \varphi \) in the following way:

\[
\varphi(n, x) = \begin{cases}
\phi(z) & \text{if there exists } z \text{ s.t. } (n, x) = (n(z), x(z)) \\
\bar{\varphi}(n, x) & \text{otherwise}
\end{cases},
\]
where \( \varphi(n, x) \) is a high enough off-equilibrium threat to deter any deviation to such \((n, x)\). \(^{12}\)

Let a type \(z\) entrepreneur’s expected profits be

\[
P(n, x, \phi, z) = \pi(n, z) - \tau x - \phi \mu \tau (\pi(n, z) - x).
\]

Given \(G\), the IRS problem is to

\[
\max_{\{n(z), x(z), \phi(z)\}_{z}} \int_{\tilde{z}} \{\tau x(z) + \phi(z)[\mu \tau (\pi(n(z), z) - x(z)) - c]\} dG(z)
\]

s.t.

\[
(F) \quad \phi(z) \in [0, 1], x(z) \in [0, \pi(n(z), z)], n(z) \geq 0, \forall z \in [\tilde{z}, \bar{z}]
\]

\[
(IR) \quad \Pi(n(z), x(z), \phi(z), z) \geq (1 - \tau)\pi(n^*(z), z), \forall z \in [\tilde{z}, \bar{z}]
\]

\[
(IC) \quad \Pi(n(z), x(z), \phi(z), z) \geq \Pi(n(\tilde{z}), x(\tilde{z}), \phi(\tilde{z}), \tilde{z}), \forall \{z, \tilde{z}\} \in [\tilde{z}, \bar{z}] \times [\tilde{z}, \bar{z}].
\]

Feasibility (F) requires that the set of offered menus corresponds to feasible probabilities, income declarations, and labor input.

Incentive compatibility (IC) requires that entrepreneurs do not have incentives to choose a different allocation from the one designed by the mechanism for them.

The set of individual rationality (IR) constraints merits some digression. As opposed to other mechanism design applications, such as monopoly screening, the “supply” of agent’s choice variables (\(n\) and \(x\), in this paper) is not controlled by the principal. Thus an agent can also deviate to an off-scheduled pair \((n, x)\). In particular, a type \(z\) entrepreneur can always declare her true profits, \(x = \pi(n, z)\), and pay the right amount of taxes. If this is the case, her post-tax profits are \((1 - \tau)\pi(n, z)\), and thus any mechanism must assign at least \((1 - \tau)\pi(n^*(z), z)\) to the entrepreneur. \(^{13}\)

In principle, entrepreneurs could also deviate to other off-scheduled allocations. However, given that any mechanism must assign at least \((1 - \tau)\pi(n^*(z), z)\) to each entrepreneur, this problem is circumvented by setting \(\varphi(n, x) = 1/\mu\) for all off-scheduled \((n, x)\). Indeed, if \(\varphi(n, x) = 1/\mu\), entrepreneurs prefer to declare their true profits instead of \(x\). \(^{14}\) Consequently, (IR) deters off-scheduled deviations, and thus it also plays a role to guarantee that incentives are compatible.

Figure 1 illustrates the role (IR) is playing in the model. Suppose the curve depicted in the left \((n, x)\)-plan represents the optimal mechanism. That is, each point in this curve

\(^{12}\)Incentive compatibility guarantees that for all \(z_1 \neq z_2\) such that \((n(z_1), x(z_1)) = (n(z_2), x(z_2))\), then \(\phi(z_1) = \phi(z_2)\).

\(^{13}\)Recall that \(n^*(z)\) is the efficient labor, and it maximizes \((1 - \tau)\pi(n, z)\).

\(^{14}\)Recall that \((1 - \tau)\pi(n, z) \geq \pi(n, z) - \tau x - \varphi(n, x)\mu \tau (\pi(n, z) - x)\) if and only if \(\varphi(n, x) \geq 1/\mu\).
is associated with a single type, and thus with an audit probability \( \phi(z) \). If any pair \((n, x)\) outside this curve is audited with intensity \( 1/\mu \), (IR) ensures that entrepreneurs stick to the curve. In other words, through off-equilibrium threats, the IRS can indirectly implement the optimal allocation.

Figure 1: Implementation.

However, in practice, it is not a sensible recommendation for policy to audit intensively whoever reports much more than expected. The right plot of Figure 1 shows an alternative way to implement the optimal mechanism. Those that report a lower income than expected are audited with a high intensity. Those that report above some threshold curve, the dashed line, are not audited. In the shadow region, between the dashed- and the full-line, auditing intensities are set in a way to deter off-schedule deviations, but not necessarily equal to \( 1/\mu \).

Using Lewis and Sappington [1989] terminology, this model displays countervailing incentives. On the one hand, a firm has incentives to underreport \( z \) and pay less taxes. On the other hand, since the reservation value, \((1 - \tau)\pi(n^*(z), z)\), is increasing in \( z \), an entrepreneur is also tempted to overstate \( z \) and be assigned a higher value. Therefore, the solution is not necessarily characterized by the full informational rent extraction of the lowest type, and standard tricks in the literature are not readily applicable here.

Sánchez and Sobel [1993] and Bigio and Zilberman [forthcoming] also consider a similar environment to study optimal enforcement policies. The former paper assumes that income is exogenous, thus auditing probabilities can not be conditioned on employment. The latter conditions the monitoring strategy only on labor input. In these papers, the IRS is assigned a fixed budget, which is exhausted in order to maximize revenue.\(^{15}\) Moreover, Sánchez and

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\(^{15}\)Operationally, both environments are similar since a budget constraint of the form \( \int \phi(z) cdG(z) \leq C \), where \( C \) is the assigned budget, can be cast in the principal’s problem using a Lagrange multiplier, say \( \xi \geq 0 \). Hence, a revenue maximizer IRS optimizes \( \int \{\tau x(z) + \phi(z) [\mu \tau (n(z), z) - x(z)] - \xi c\} dG(z) + \xi C \) subject to (F), (IR), and (IC).
Sobel [1993] consider a more general tax schedule, while Bigio and Zilberman [forthcoming] consider more general production and audit cost functions. For simplicity, I specify functional forms for these primitives, although in Section 6, I discuss to what extent they can be relaxed. Finally, I refer these papers for further discussions on most of the assumptions used here.

3 Implementability

Let $U$ denote the informational rent an agent gets. Hence,

$$U(z) = \max_{\tilde{z} \in [z, \tau]} \{\pi(n(\tilde{z}), z) - \tau x(\tilde{z}) - \phi(\tilde{z})\mu \tau (\pi(n(\tilde{z}), z) - x(\tilde{z})) - (1 - \tau)\pi(n^*(z), z)\}. \quad (1)$$

The following lemma is standard and states necessary and sufficient conditions for the incentive compatibility constraint be globally satisfied.

**Lemma 1.** Incentive compatibility is verified if and only if

\begin{align*}
(LIC) : & \quad \frac{dU}{dz}(z) = (1 - \phi(z)\mu \tau)pn(z)^\alpha - (1 - \tau)pn^*(z)^\alpha, \text{ a.e.} \\
(M) : & \quad n(z)^\alpha(1 - \phi(z)\mu \tau) \text{ is non-decreasing,}
\end{align*}

and that $U$ is absolutely continuous.

These two conditions are crucial to understand the results in this paper. The local incentive compatibility (LIC) follows from applying the envelope theorem to (1), and evaluating the resulting equation at $\tilde{z} = z$. It specifies the required slope of the informational rent, $U(z)$, to induce truthtelling. Notice that (LIC) provides a clear interpretation of countervailing incentives. Indeed, the first term captures the incentives to understate $z$, and declare less profits, whereas the second term captures the temptation to overstate $z$, and thus be assigned a higher reservation value.

(M) is a variant of the monotonicity condition present in the mechanism design literature. If, for example, on-equilibrium audits are ruled out from the problem, that is $\phi(z) = 0$ for all $z$, then (M) collapses to $n(z)$ being non-decreasing. Intuitively, by setting high enough off-equilibrium auditing intensities, the IRS can always shape reported income $x$ to work as if it were compensatory transfers, as in a textbook mechanism design problem (e.g., Fudenberg and Tirole [1991]). Hence, a non-decreasing labor schedule is sufficient for implementability.

On the other hand, if the monitoring strategy did not depend on $n$, then labor distortions could not be used to provide incentives. Hence, (M) would be equivalent to $\phi(z)$ being non-
increasing. This is a standard property in the optimal tax enforcement literature.\textsuperscript{16} It prevents higher-types from mimicking a low-type in order to pay less taxes. Following the steps in Bigio and Zilberman [forthcoming], one can show that if labor is unobservable, then the next proposition, originally from Sánchez and Sobel [1993], holds.

Let the superscript $x$ denote the optimal solution when the monitoring strategy is conditioned only on reported income.

**Proposition 1.** (Sánchez and Sobel [1993], adapted) If the monitoring strategy does not depend on labor input, then there always exists a solution to the model of the following form:

$$n^x(z) = n^*(z) \quad \text{if} \quad z \leq z^x \leq z,$$

$$\phi^x(z) = \begin{cases} 1/\mu & \text{if} \quad z^x \leq z < z \,, \\ 0 & \text{if} \quad z \leq z^x \leq z \,, \end{cases}$$

$$x^x(z) = \begin{cases} \pi(n^*(z), z) & \text{if} \quad z^x \leq z < z \,, \\ \pi(n^*(z^x), z^x) & \text{if} \quad z \leq z^x \leq z \,, \end{cases}$$

where $z^x \in [z, z]$.

In words, there is a threshold type $z^x$, such that the IRS monitors every type below $z^x$ in a way that generates truthfully income report. Similarly, every type greater than, or equal to, $z^x$ is not audited, and reports $z^x$’s profits. As a consequence, the most productive firms are the set of evaders. Note that policy cannot distort labor input, so production is carried out efficiently.\textsuperscript{17}

By combining the use of both labor distortions and auditing intensities to provide incentives, standard monotone conditions can be relaxed, while incentive compatibility is still satisfied. How should distortions and audits be optimally combined to enforce taxes? This is the question I tackle in the next sections.

### 4 Example

This section shows an example that summarizes the intuition behind the results in this paper. In the next section, an analytical solution is provided.

\textsuperscript{16}When taxpayers are risk averse, Mookherjee and Png [1989] show that the monotonicity of the monitoring strategy may not hold.

\textsuperscript{17}When the monitoring strategy depends only on labor, as in Bigio and Zilberman [forthcoming], the IRS audits the most productive entrepreneurs in a way that generates efficient production and truthfully income report. In contrast, lower-types are not audited and report zero profits. Moreover, some of the lower-types have their labor input distorted away from its efficient level in order to prevent higher-types from mimicking them, which generates a missing middle, that is the fact that medium firms are scarce.
In this example, I assume \( z \) follows a uniform distribution with support \([2, 3]\), \( \alpha = 1/2, \ p = 1, \ \mu \tau = 1, \) and \( \tau = 0.25. \)

Figure 2 illustrates the solution for different values of \( c \). Rows depict the behavior of employment \( n \), reported income \( x \), auditing intensity \( \phi \), and the informational rent \( U \), respectively. The first column considers \( c = 0 \). Since the IRS faces no cost to audit entrepreneurs, the full-information revenue is recovered. In particular, audits suffice to fully enforce taxes, and labor is not distorted away from its efficient level. That is, \( n(z) = n^*(z), \ x(z) = \pi(n^*(z), z), \) and \( \phi(z) = 1/\mu \) almost everywhere.

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In the next section, I state three additional assumptions on the primitives and one property that the solution must have to be optimal. Those are satisfied in this example.
On the other hand, if \( c \) is high enough as in the forth column,\(^{19}\) it is too costly to use auditing probabilities in equilibrium. Therefore, only labor distortions are used. As in a standard mechanism design problem, the top-type is not distorted away from the full-information case, that is \( n(\overline{z}) = n^*(\overline{z}) \) and \( \phi(\overline{z}) = 0 \), while labor is distorted downwards to provide incentives. Below a threshold type, call it \( z_1 \), depicted by the dashed-line, the individual rationality binds, which places a limit on the further use of distortions to provide incentives. In particular, employment has to be adjusted to keep \( U(z) = 0 \) for \( z \leq z_1 \). As opposed to problems without countervailing incentives, the individual rationality can bind at intermediate types.

The most interesting case is when \( c \) assumes intermediate values, as in the second and third columns, for \( c = 0.35 \) and \( c = 0.45 \), respectively.

Similarly, the “non-distortion at the top” result also holds here, and labor is distorted downwards up to a threshold type, call it \( z_2 \), which is the (right) dashed-line in the second (third) column. In this region, only distortions are used.

Below \( z_2 \), up to another threshold, call it \( z_3 \), which is the left dashed-line in the second column,\(^{20}\) the IRS combines both distortions and audits to enforce taxes. In particular, for \( z \in [z_3, z_2) \), both \( \phi(z) \) and \( n(z) \) are increasing. Moreover, at \( z = z_2 \), both the labor input and the auditing intensity drop discontinuously (this discontinuity might not be visible in Figure 2, so I reproduce the plots for \( c = 0.35 \) in Figure 3). In this region, the individual rationality binds.

To understand the intuition behind the jump, notice that, in order to increase net revenue, the use of audits are twofold: (1) it enforces taxes from those that are audited; (2) it prevents deviations from other types, allowing the IRS to require higher income declarations from them. In the top range of the type distribution, entrepreneurs have strong incentives to understate their type, and then pay less taxes. Hence, monitoring those at the top is effective to enforce their taxes, but ineffective to prevent deviations from other types. The jump of the monitoring strategy at \( z_2 \) balances these two goals. It allows the IRS to audit and enforce taxes from a somewhat set of productive types, at the same time that establishes a lower bound on the income reported by the highest types.

If the monitoring strategy depended only on reported income, as in Proposition 1, the same reasoning would justify a discontinuously drop of the monitoring strategy. However, the ablest entrepreneurs do not report, or bunch at, the threshold type income anymore. Intuitively, by continuously distorting labor downwards to provide incentives, the IRS can separate the equilibrium and design an increasing reported income schedule. The jump in

\(^{19}\)In this particular example, for \( c \geq 0.54 \).

\(^{20}\)In this example, for all \( c > 0.375 \), \( z_3 > \overline{z} \). If \( c \leq 0.375 \), \( z_3 = \overline{z} \).
the labor schedule is necessary to keep $U$ continuous, and thus preserve incentive compatibility. At the same time, it also assigns less distortions for those below $z_2$, which increases production and net revenue collection.

To understand the intuition behind an increasing monitoring strategy at $[z_3, z_2]$, recall from Lemma 1 that the possibility to screen over $n$ relaxes the monotonicity requirement that $\phi(z)$ is non-increasing. Hence, a non-monotone monitoring strategy is consistent with incentive compatibility. Moreover, incentives to overstate $z$, and be assigned a higher reservation value, are stronger in the bottom range of the type distribution. Therefore, an increasing monitoring strategy at $[z_3, z_2]$ not only prevents misreporting, but also allows the IRS to save expenses by selecting a more productive group of entrepreneurs to audit.

Finally, in the third column of Figure 2, for $z \leq z_3$, feasibility imposes a limit on the further use of auditing probabilities. Thus labor distortions are adjusted to respect individual rationality, which is still binding in this region. In this case, the lowest types are not monitored in equilibrium.

Interestingly, if $c$ is not too high, the model predicts a missing middle in the reported income space. In words, some intermediate values of income are never reported to the IRS.
Moreover, two different types might be assigned the same labor input.

In the next three subsections, I use this example to discuss further insights from the model. Namely, I discuss the case in which \( \tau = 1 \), the implications of the optimal mechanism, and the potential net revenue gain and efficiency loss from adopting this mechanism.

### 4.1 \( \tau = 1 \)

\( \tau = 1 \) describes a context in which the principal aims to fully appropriate the agent’s profits. This action can be legitimate, as the example of a holding company requiring reports on the profitability of its subsidiaries. But it can also be illegitimate, as the example of a local mafia extorting business owners.

If \( \tau = 1 \), the monitoring strategy becomes the standard cut-off rule. That is, every \( z \) below a threshold type is audited with intensity \( 1/\mu \), while every \( z \) above it is not monitored. Intuitively, the reservation value, \( (1 - \tau)\pi(z^*, z) \), ceases to be type-dependent, and thus countervailing incentives are ruled out. (LIC) and (M) become

\[
\begin{align*}
(LIC_{\tau=1}) : & \quad \frac{dU}{dz}(z) = (1 - \phi(z)\mu)n(z)^\alpha, \text{ a.e.} \\
(M_{\tau=1}) : & \quad n(z)^\alpha(1 - \phi(z)\mu) \text{ is non-decreasing,}
\end{align*}
\]

respectively. Interestingly, a non-monotone monitoring strategy could be implementable, although it is not optimal.

Therefore, a type-dependent reservation value is necessary to break the monotonicity result that \( \phi(z) \) is non-increasing. But is it sufficient? No, if labor input is not observable, Proposition 1 follows and the optimal monitoring strategy is the cut-off rule. Assume \( \tau < 1 \), so (LIC) and (M) become

\[
\begin{align*}
(LIC_{x}) : & \quad \frac{dU}{dz}(z) = (1 - \phi(z)\mu\tau)n^*(z)^\alpha - (1 - \tau)n^*(z)^\alpha, \text{ a.e.} \\
(M_{x}) : & \quad \phi(z) \text{ is non-increasing,}
\end{align*}
\]

respectively. The IRS can not implement a non-monotone monitoring strategy.

Consequently, countervailing incentives and the possibility to screen over labor are the driving forces behind the results in this paper.

### 4.2 Implications

In a risk-neutral environment, in which the IRS can credibly commit to a monitoring strategy that depends only on reported income, the cut-off audit rule derived in Proposition 1 is a
remarkable robust result. However, its policy implications are unsatisfactory for two reasons. First, the amount underreported as a fraction of income increases with income, introducing a regressive bias on effective taxes. Second, only those that declare income honestly will be audited, which are precisely the poorest taxpayers. In this section, I show how these implications change once the monitoring strategy also depends on labor.

4.2.1 Underreported income

Let underreported income as a fraction of true income be $1 - x(z)/\pi(n(z), z)$. Figure 4 plots this variable for different values of $c$. The full-line represents the optimal mechanism when the monitoring strategy depends on both reported profits and labor input, while the dashed-line conditions the monitoring strategy only on the former.\footnote{Following the steps in Sánchez and Sobel [1993], $z_x$ (from Proposition 1) is the unique root in $[2, 3]$ that solves $c = \mu \tau 1 - G(s) p n^*(s) = (3 - s)s/2$ in $s$, given $c \in [0, 1]$. That is, $z_x = \frac{1 + \sqrt{9 - 8c}}{2}$. For $c > 1$, such a root does not exist, thus $z_x = \hat{z} = 2$.}

Figure 4: Underreported income as a fraction of true income.

In contrast with the previous literature, every taxpayer evades in the model. More interestingly, the relationship between the fraction of income that is underreported and income is non-monotone and discontinuous. In particular, those in the bottom and top underreport proportionally more than those in the middle range of the type distribution.

4.2.2 Effective tax rate: regressive or progressive bias?

If the IRS screens only over reported income, effective taxes are regressive, since the set of evaders is the most productive firms. Once the monitoring strategy is conditioned on a
signal of the true income, this regressive bias could be mitigated.\footnote{To my knowledge, Scotchmer [1987] was the first to formally point out this possibility. In her model, taxpayers are grouped into classes according to their income signal. As a result, effective taxes are progressive across classes, although regressive within. In her paper, both income and its signal are exogenous. See also Macho-Stadler and Pérez-Castrillo [2002]. In Bigio and Zilberman [forthcoming], for instance, effective taxes are progressive since the lowest types are the set of evaders.}

Let the expected effective tax rate for a given type $z$ be

$$
\tau^e(z) \equiv \frac{\tau x(z) + \mu \tau \phi(z)(\pi(n(z), z) - x(z))}{\pi(n(z), z)}.
$$

Figure 5 plots $\tau^e(z)$ against true profits for different values of $c$. The full-line represents the optimal mechanism when the monitoring strategy depends on both reported profits and labor input, while the dashed-line conditions the monitoring strategy only on the former.

Effective taxes are unevenly distributed. If on the one hand, the poorest entrepreneurs are paying proportionally less taxes. On the other hand, effective taxes decrease in the top range of the distribution. Therefore, the overall bias, that arises from evasion, on the progressiveness of taxes is unknown. Intuitively, by placing higher effective taxes in the middle range of the type distribution, not only does the IRS prevent those in the top range from understating $z$, but also target its audit expenses towards a more productive group of entrepreneurs.
4.2.3 Outcomes of audits

Once the IRS commits to the cut-off audit rule described in Proposition 1, all audited taxpayers are known to have reported honestly. This case is depicted in the first plot of Figure 6, where the thick red line is the optimal monitoring strategy, while the black thin line is the amount evaded, that is \( \tau(\pi(n(z), z) - x(z)) \). Ex-post, audits do not generate revenue for the government. Hence, the IRS is tempted to deviate from its announced monitoring strategy and audit the ablest entrepreneurs.

![Figure 6](image)

Figure 6: Outcomes of audits, \( \phi(z) \) vs. \( \tau(\pi(n(z), z) - x(z)) \), (c=0.45).

Once the audit rule also depends on \( n \), as in the second plot, audits generate some gross revenue, but not necessarily positive net revenue. More importantly, audits are not targeting honest taxpayers anymore. Hence, although there still exists ex-post profitable deviations, a stronger case for the IRS ability to commit can be made.

Finally, the richest taxpayers are never audited in both mechanisms. However, in contrast with the cut-off audit rule, the poorest taxpayers might also not be audited once the monitoring strategy is conditioned on \( n \).

4.3 Net revenue collection

It is the possibility to set off-equilibrium threats that makes audits a powerful tool to enforce taxes. As Figure 1 and the second row of Figure 2 illustrate, for any value of \( c \), the reported income schedule is positive, which translates into a positive lower bound on the net revenue.
collected. However, by conditioning the monitoring strategy on labor, net revenue increases at an efficiency loss due to distortions imposed almost everywhere. Figure 7 illustrates this trade-off. The left panel plots net revenue collection as function of the audit cost, ranging from zero to one. The full-line accounts for a monitoring strategy that depends on both reported profits and labor input, while the dashed-line considers a monitoring strategy conditioned only on the former. Finally, the dot-line considers the case in which every entrepreneur is audited with intensity $1/\mu$, which ensures truthful income report and efficient employment. The right panel plots the net revenue collection as a fraction of the aggregate product. Notice that, for some values of $c$, as $c$ decreases, the distortions imposed by policy is high enough to reduce net revenue collection as a fraction of aggregate product.

Figure 7: Net revenue collection.

---

23Similarly, when labor is not observable and $c$ becomes arbitrarily large, taxpayers declare the lowest-type income (see Proposition 1).

24For $c \leq 1$, this is precisely the optimal strategy when the monitoring strategy depends only on employment. Indeed, going through the steps in Bigio and Zilberman [forthcoming], a type $z$ is monitored with intensity $1/\mu$ whenever $\tau \pi(n^*(z), z) \geq c/\mu$. Hence, since $\pi(n^*(z), z) = 1 \geq c$ in this example, all types are monitored with intensity $1/\mu$.

25By aggregate product, I mean $\int zn(z)^{\alpha}dG(z)$, which varies with the distortions induced by policy.
5 Solution

Given the characterization of (IC) in Lemma 1, the IRS problem is to solve

\[
\max_{\{n(z), U(z), \phi(z)\}} \int_{z}^{\bar{z}} \left[ \pi(n(z), z) - U(z) - c\phi(z) \right] dG(z) - \Omega \\
\text{s.t.} \\
(F) \quad \phi(z) \geq 0, \forall z \in [z, \bar{z}] \\
(IR) \quad U(z) \geq 0, \forall z \in [z, \bar{z}] \\
(LIC) \quad \frac{dU}{dz}(z) = \left(1 - \phi(z)\mu \tau\right)pn(z)\alpha - (1 - \tau)pn^*(z)\alpha, \text{ a.e.,}
\]

where \( \Omega = \int_{z}^{\bar{z}} (1 - \tau)\pi(n^*(z), z) dG(z). \)

To solve this problem I ignore (M), \( \phi(z) \leq 1, n(z) \geq 0, x(z) \geq 0, \) and \( x(z) \leq \pi(n(z), z), \) for all \( z, \) from the set of constraints. Notice that \( x(z) \leq \pi(n(z), z) \) is implied by (IR),\(^{26}\) and that \( \phi(z) \leq 1 \) never binds in equilibrium.\(^{27}\) The remaining ignored constraints must be verified in equilibrium.

Let \( \lambda \) be the costate variable associated with the state variable \( U. \) The Hamiltonian is

\[
H(U, n, \phi, \lambda, z) = [pn^\alpha - n - U - c\phi]g(z) + \lambda[(1 - \phi\mu \tau)pn^\alpha - (1 - \tau)pn^*(z)^\alpha]. \tag{2}
\]

For a given type \( z, \) let \( \omega(z) \) and \( \theta(z) \) be the Lagrange multipliers associated with \( \phi(z) \geq 0 \) and \( U(z) \geq 0, \) respectively. The Lagrangian is

\[
L(U, n, \phi, \lambda, z) = H(U, n, \phi, \lambda, z) + \theta U + \omega \phi.
\]

Let the superscript \( o \) denote the optimum solution to the optimization problem stated above. Following Seierstad and Sydsæter [1987] (Theorem 2, page 361), given that \( H \) is concave in \( \phi, \) the following set of conditions is sufficient for a global maximum.

1. \[
\left[ z + (1 - \mu \tau \phi^o(z)) \frac{\lambda(z)}{g(z)} \right] \alpha pn^o(z)\alpha^{-1} = 1;
\]
2. \[
cg(z) + \lambda(z)\mu \tau pn^o(z)\alpha = \omega(z);
\]
3. \[
\frac{d\lambda}{dz}(z) = g(z) - \theta(z);
\]
4. \[
\frac{df^o}{dz}(z) = (1 - \mu \tau \phi^o(z))pn^o(z)\alpha - (1 - \tau)pn^*(z)^\alpha;
\]

\(^{26}\)Indeed, \( x(z) \leq \pi(n(z), z) \) if and only if \( U(z) \geq (1 - \tau)\pi(n(z), z) - \pi(n^*(z), z) \).

\(^{27}\)Recall from Section 2 that \( \phi(z) = 1/\mu \) suffices to generate truthful income report and to provide incentives. Since monitoring is costly, \( \phi(z) \leq 1/\mu \) in equilibrium.
5. \( \omega(z) \geq 0; \phi'(z) \geq 0; \omega(z) \phi''(z) = 0; \)

6. \( \theta(z) \geq 0; U'(z) \geq 0; \theta(z) U''(z) = 0; \)

7. \( \lambda(z) U'(z) = 0; \lambda(z) \leq 0; \lambda(z) U''(z) = 0; \lambda(z) \geq 0; \)

8. \( \lambda(z^-) \geq \lambda(z^+); [\lambda(z^-) - \lambda(z^+)] U'(z) = 0; \)

9. \( -\lambda(z) \leq \frac{z g(z)}{(1-\mu \phi''(z))}. \)

1. and 2. are the first order conditions with respect to \( n \) and \( \phi \), respectively. 3. is the costate law of motion. 4. is the local incentive compatibility constraint. 5. and 6. are the complementary slackness conditions that ensure feasibility and individual rationality respectively. 7. is the set of transversality conditions. 8. needs to be satisfied if the costate \( \lambda \) is allowed to be discontinuous. 28 Finally, 9. guarantees that the Hamiltonian is concave in \( n \). Notice that 9. can be ignored since it is implied by 1. and \( \phi''(z) \leq 1/\mu. \)

The proof consists of a guess and verify method. The trick is to conjecture the subsets of the type space \([z, \overline{z}]\), in which the inequalities \( U'' \geq 0 \) and \( \phi'' \geq 0 \) are binding. In other words, to set the appropriate values for the Lagrange multipliers \( \theta \) and \( \omega \) along the interval \([z, \overline{z}]. \)

First, note that if the solution is continuously differentiable at the top-type \( \overline{z} \), then \( n''(\overline{z}) = n^*'(\overline{z}), \phi'(\overline{z}) = 0, \) and \( U'(\overline{z}) > 0. \) Moreover, \( \lambda(\overline{z}) = 0, \omega(\overline{z}) > 0 \) and \( \theta(\overline{z}) = 0. \)

By continuity, \( U'(z) > 0 \) and \( \omega(z) > 0 \), which implies \( \theta(z) = 0 \) and \( \phi''(z) = 0, \) for all \( z < \overline{z} \) in a small neighborhood of \( \overline{z}. \) Moreover, by solving the differential equation 3. with boundary \( \lambda(\overline{z}) = 0, \) one gets \( \lambda(z) = G(z) - 1. \) From 1., \( n''(z) = \left(\alpha \left[ z - \frac{1-G(z)}{g(z)} \right] \right)^{1-\alpha} \) in this neighborhood.

To proceed with the analysis, I assume one restriction on the distribution of types. Define \( h \equiv \frac{1-G}{g}, \) that is one over the hazard rate, and \( \gamma \equiv \left[ 1 - (1 - \tau)^{1-\alpha} \right] \in (0, 1). \)

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28 Throughout the paper I use the following notation: \( h(z^-) \) is the left limit of \( h \) at \( z, \) \( h(z^+) \) is the right limit of \( h \) at \( z, \) \( \frac{dz^-}{dz} \) is the left derivative of \( h \) at \( z, \) and \( \frac{d^+h}{dz} \) is the right derivative of \( h \) at \( z. \)

29 This strategy is partially inspired by Maggi and Rodriguez-Clare [1995] analysis of a mechanism design problem that features a type-dependent participation constraint. However, since this setup is different, the map from this paper to theirs is not perfect. In particular, here, the agent’s objective is not quasi-linear and there are two decision variables. Moreover, for a certain range of values for \( c, \) the optimal mechanism is discontinuous. See Jullien [2000] for an alternative treatment of type-dependent participation constraints.

30 Indeed, from 7., \( \lambda(\overline{z}) \geq 0. \) Hence, since \( c > 0, \) then \( \omega(\overline{z}) > 0 \) (from 2.) and \( \phi(\overline{z}) = 0 \) (from 5.). Moreover, \( n''(\overline{z}) \geq n^*(\overline{z}) \) (from 1.), which implies \( \frac{d^+ n''(z)}{dz} > 0 \) (from 4.). If by contradiction \( U'(\overline{z}) = 0, \) then there exists \( z < \overline{z} \) such that \( U'(z) < 0, \) which violates 6. Hence, \( U'(\overline{z}) > 0, \) which implies \( \lambda(\overline{z}) = 0 \) (from 7.), \( \theta(\overline{z}) = 0 \) (from 6.), and \( n''(z) = n^*(z) \) (from 1.).
Assumption 1. \( \gamma z - h(z) \) is non-decreasing.

This assumption is a weaker version of the monotone hazard rate condition, commonly assumed in the literature. Indeed, if \( h(z) \) is non-increasing then Assumption 1 holds. The role of this assumption is twofold: first, it ensures that (M) is satisfied without the additional expositional cost of dealing with bunching; second, it guarantees that the individual rationality constraints are not violated.

The task, now, is to find a region in the type space, such that either \( \phi^o(z) \geq 0 \) or \( \theta(z) \geq 0 \) ceases to hold with equality. Notice that for all \( z \) in a small neighborhood of \( \overline{z} \), both

\[
\frac{dU^o}{dz}(z) = p(\alpha p[z - h(z)])^{\frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha}} - (1-\tau)p(\alpha p z)^{\frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha}} > 0 \quad \text{(from 4.)} \quad (3)
\]

and

\[
 cg(z) + \lambda(z) \mu \tau p n^o(z)^\alpha = g(z) \left[ c - h(z) \mu \tau p (\alpha p[z - h(z)])^{\frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha}} \right] > 0 \quad \text{(from 2.)} \quad (4)
\]

hold by continuity. I conjecture that \( \phi^o(z) \geq 0 \) or \( \theta(z) \geq 0 \) or both ceases to hold with equality whenever one of the inequalities in (3) or (4) is strictly reversed. Interestingly, the solution displays the property that \( U^o(z) = 0 \) if and only if \( \frac{dU^o}{dz}(z) = 0 \)

Formally, define \( A(z) \equiv \gamma z - h(z) \),\(^{31}\) which is non-decreasing by Assumption 1, and let

\[
z_1 = \sup \{ s \in [z, \overline{z}] : A(s) \leq 0 \}. \quad (5)
\]

The term in curly brackets in equation (5) is obtained from reverting the inequality in (3). Recall that \( \sup \{ s \in [z, \overline{z}] : A(s) \leq 0 \} = \overline{z} \). By construction, if \( \{ s \in [z, \overline{z}] : A(s) \leq 0 \} \) is not empty, Assumption 1 implies that \( z_1 \) is the highest root that solves \( A(s) = 0 \), and that \( \frac{dU^o}{dz}(z) > 0 \) for all \( z > z_1 \).

Similarly, define \( B(z) \equiv h(z) \mu \tau p (\alpha p[z - h(z)])^{\frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha}} \), and let

\[
z_2 = \sup \{ s \in [z, \overline{z}] : B(s) > c \}. \quad (6)
\]

The term in curly brackets in equation (6) is obtained from strictly reverting the inequality in (4). By construction, if \( \{ s \in [z, \overline{z}] : B(s) > c \} \) is not empty, then \( B(z_2) = c \).

In words, analyzing from the right, if \( z_1 \geq z_2 \), then the differential equation in 4. would be equalized to zero before conditions 2. and 5. are violated. On the other hand, if \( z_2 > z_1 \), \( \phi(z) = 0 \) for some \( z < z_2 \) would violate conditions 2. and 5. before the differential equation

\(^{31}\)Recall that \( \gamma \equiv [1 - (1-\tau)^{\frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha}}] \in (0, 1) \).
in 4. is equalized to zero. In particular, I show that for \( z \leq \max\{z_1, z_2\} \), \( \theta(z) \geq 0 \) or \( \phi^o(z) \geq 0 \) or both cease to hold with equality.

First, consider the case \( z_1 \geq z_2 \), or equivalently \( c \geq \max_{s \in [z_1, z_2]} B(s) \). The next proposition studies the case depicted in the forth column in Figure 2, in which \( c \) is too high.

**Proposition 2.** If \( z_1 \geq z_2 \) (that is, \( c \geq \max_{s \in [z_1, z_2]} B(s) \)), then

\[
n^o(z) = \begin{cases} 
(1 - \tau)^{\frac{1}{\alpha}} (\alpha p z)^{\frac{1}{1 - \alpha}} & \text{if } z \leq z < z_1 \\
(\alpha p [z - h(z)])^{\frac{1}{1 - \alpha}} & \text{if } z_1 \leq z \leq z_2,
\end{cases}
\]

\[
\phi^o(z) = 0 \quad \text{if } \hat{z} \leq z \leq z_2,
\]

\[
U^o(z) = \begin{cases} 
0 & \text{if } z \leq z < z_1 \\
p \int_{z_1}^{z} \left( (\alpha p [s - h(s)])^{\frac{1}{1 - \alpha}} - (1 - \tau)(\alpha p s)^{\frac{1}{1 - \alpha}} \right) ds & \text{if } z_1 \leq z \leq z_2,
\end{cases}
\]

\[
\lambda(z) = \begin{cases} 
-\gamma z g(z) & \text{if } \hat{z} \leq z < z_1 \\
G(z) - 1 & \text{if } z_1 \leq z \leq z_2.
\end{cases}
\]

Moreover, the solution is continuous.

**Proof.** For \( z \geq z_1 \), the proof is outlined in the text. Hence, if \( z_1 = \hat{z} \) the result follows.

Assume \( z_1 > \hat{z} \). For \( z < z_1 \), set \( \phi^o(z) = 0 \), and solve 1. and 4. (equalized to zero) in \( n^o(z) \) and \( \lambda(z) \). Hence, \( \lambda(z) = -\gamma z g(z) \) and \( n^o(z) = (1 - \tau)^{\frac{1}{\alpha}} (\alpha p z)^{\frac{1}{1 - \alpha}} \). By construction, \( \lambda(z) \) is continuous, so 8. is satisfied.

Note that Assumption 1 implies that \(-[\gamma g(z) + g'(z) h(z)] \leq g(z)\). From 3. and 6., \( \theta(z) = g(z) - \frac{d}{dz}(\hat{z}) \geq 0 \) is equivalent to \(-[\gamma g(z) + z g'(z)] \leq g(z)\), which is satisfied if \( g(z) + z g'(z) \geq 0 \). If \( g(z) + z g'(z) \leq 0 \), which implies that \( g'(z) < 0 \), it is enough to show that \(-[\gamma g(z) + g'(z)] \leq -[\gamma g(z) + g'(z) h(z)]\), or equivalently, \( \gamma z \leq h(z) \) for all \( z \leq z_1 \), which follows from \( z_1 \)'s definition. Hence, \( \lambda(z) < 0 \) and \( U^o(z) = 0 \) are consistent with condition 6., the differential equation in 4. equalized to zero, and condition 7.

It remains to show that conditions 2. and 5. hold, that is \( \omega(z) = cg(z) + \lambda(z) \mu \tau p(n^o(z))^\alpha \geq 0 \). In fact, by plugging \( \lambda(z) \) and \( n^o(z) \) into this expression, one obtains \( \gamma z \mu \tau p(1 - \tau)(\alpha p z)^{\frac{\alpha}{1 - \alpha}} \leq c \). Hence, it is enough to show that \( \gamma z_1 \mu \tau p(1 - \tau)(\alpha p z_1)^{\frac{\alpha}{1 - \alpha}} \leq c \). Recalling the definition of \( z_1 \), this requirement collapses to \( B(z_1) \leq c \), which follows from \( z_1 \geq z_2 \).

Finally, it is straightforward to verify that \( \frac{d}{dz}(z) \geq 0 \), \( \frac{d}{dz}(z) = 0 \), \( \frac{d}{dz}(x^o(z)) \geq 0 \), whenever these derivatives exist, and \( n^o(z) \geq 0 \) and \( x^o(z) \geq 0 \). Hence, the omitted constraints are satisfied. \( \square \)

Consider \( z_2 > z_1 \) instead. Hence, \( \omega(z_2) = 0 \) and \( \frac{d}{dz}(U^o(z_2)) \geq 0 \). One attempt to solve this case is to keep \( \lambda(z) = G(z) - 1 \) in a small neighborhood of \( z_2 \), and for \( z < z_2 \), let both \( n^o(z) \)
and $\phi^o(z)$ jointly solve conditions 1. and 2. (with $\omega(z) = 0$) in this neighborhood. However, the solution to this system implies that $\phi^o(z) < 0$ for some $z < z_2$ in any neighborhood of $z_2$.\footnote{Indeed, fix $z < z_2$ in a small neighborhood of $z_2$ such that $B(z) > c$. By solving condition 2. (with $\omega(z) = 0$) at $n(z)$ and using $c < B(z)$, one obtains $n^o(z) < (\alpha p|z - h(z)|)^{1-\alpha}$. An inspection of condition 1. shows that this inequality is true if and only if $\phi^o(z) < 0$.} Hence, this approach does not work. To make further progress, $\lambda(z)$ needs to be changed for $z < z_2$, and from conditions 3., 7. and 8., it follows that $U^o(z_2) = 0$.

Consequently, a natural candidate for the optimal mechanism when $z < z_2$ and $z_2 > z_1$ is the solution to the following system of three equations in three unknowns ($\phi$, $n$ and $\lambda$).

\begin{align*}
[g(z)z + (1 - \mu \tau \phi)\lambda] \alpha pn^{\alpha - 1} - g(z) &= 0 \\
\mu \tau \lambda pn^\alpha &= 0 \\
(1 - \mu \tau \phi) n^\alpha - (1 - \tau)(\alpha pz)^{1-\alpha} &= 0.
\end{align*}

These equations are conditions 1., 2. (with $\omega = 0$), and the differential equation in 4. equalized to zero. The following assumption guarantees that if a solution exists, it is unique.

Assumption 2. $\tau \leq 1 - \left(\frac{2\alpha}{1+\alpha}\right)^{\frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha}}$.

If the tax rate is 25%, any $\alpha \geq 0.22$ satisfies this assumption. Similar, if $\alpha = 2/3$, then it is satisfied for any $\tau \leq 0.36$. Therefore, Assumption 2 holds for empirically plausible values of $\tau$ and $\alpha$. However, if $\tau > 0.4$, this assumption is violated for any value of $\alpha$.

Note that the derivative of the reservation value with respect to $z$, $(1 - \tau)pn^*(z)^\alpha$, is decreasing in $\tau$. Therefore, this assumption ensures that countervailing incentives are strong enough.

The following lemma states sufficient conditions for existence and uniqueness of a solution to the system in (7).

**Lemma 2.** For $\phi \in [0, 1/\mu]$ and $n \geq 0$:

If $c > \frac{\mu \tau}{\alpha} [(1 - \tau) - (1 - \tau)^{1/\alpha}] (\alpha pz)^{\frac{1}{1-\alpha}}$, then the system of equations in (7) does not have a solution.

If $c \leq \frac{\mu \tau}{\alpha} [(1 - \tau) - (1 - \tau)^{1/\alpha}] (\alpha pz)^{\frac{1}{1-\alpha}}$, it has a unique solution.

The proof is in the Appendix. This system might not have a solution for some small values of $z$. Define $z_3 \in [0, \infty)$ as being the unique root that solves the following equation in $s$.

$$\frac{\mu \tau}{\alpha} [(1 - \tau) - (1 - \tau)^{1/\alpha}] (\alpha ps)^{\frac{1}{1-\alpha}} = c$$
If \( z_3 < \hat{z} \), redefine \( z_3 = \hat{z} \). Therefore, for all \( z \in [z_3, z_2) \), the system in (7) has a unique solution. Let it be denoted by \( \{ \hat{n}(z), \hat{\phi}(z), \hat{\lambda}(z) \}_{z \in [z_3, z_2)} \).

The following lemma states some properties this solution has.

**Lemma 3.** \( \{ \hat{n}(z), \hat{\phi}(z), \hat{\lambda}(z) \}_{z \in [z_3, z_2)} \) has the following properties:

1. \( \hat{n}(z) \in [(1 - \tau)n^*(z), n^*(z)]; \hat{\phi}(z) \in [0, 1/\mu]; \hat{\lambda}(z) < 0; \)
2. if \( z_3 \in (\hat{z}, z_2) \), then \( \hat{n}(z_3) = (1 - \tau)\frac{1}{\alpha} \) \( \alpha \rho z_3 \frac{1 - \alpha}{1 - \alpha} + 1 \); \( \hat{\phi}(z_3) = 0 \); \( \hat{\lambda}(z_3) = [(1 - \tau)\frac{1}{\alpha} - 1]z_3g(z_3) \);
3. \( \frac{d\hat{n}}{dz}(z) \geq 0 \) and \( \frac{d\hat{\phi}}{dz}(z) \geq 0 \);
4. \( \hat{n}(z) \) and \( \hat{\phi}(z) \) are independent of the distribution of types;
5. \( (1 - \mu \tau \hat{\phi}(z))\hat{n}(z)^{\alpha} = (1 - \tau)(\alpha \rho z) \frac{1 - \alpha}{1 - \alpha} \).

This lemma is proved in the Appendix. The first and second properties state that the candidate for the optimal mechanism is feasible and continuous at \( z_3 \) if \( z_3 \in (\hat{z}, z_2) \), respectively. The third and forth properties say that the labor input and auditing probabilities, that solve (7), are increasing in \( z \), and do not depend on \( G \), although \( z_2 \) depends. Finally, the fifth is simply the last equation of the system in (7), which guarantees that (M) is satisfied.

At this degree of generality, it is not possible to characterize closed-form solutions to \( \{ \hat{n}(z), \hat{\phi}(z), \hat{\lambda}(z) \}_{z \in [z_3, z_2)} \) for all possible values of \( \alpha \).\(^{33}\) Hence, to proceed with the analysis, I state a property that this solution might or might not have.

**Property 1.** For all \( z \in [z_3, z_2) \), \( \frac{d\hat{\lambda}}{dz}(z) \leq g(z) \).

If Property 1 holds, it is possible to characterize the optimal mechanism. This property is needed to ensure that \( \theta(z) \geq 0 \) for all \( z \in [z_3, z_2) \), which guarantees that the individual rationality is satisfied (see conditions 3. and 6.).

The following lemma gives a sufficient condition to ensure that Property 1 holds. Define \( \rho \equiv \frac{1 + \tau}{\alpha} (1 - \tau) \frac{1 - \alpha}{1 - \alpha} - 2 \), and note that \( \rho \geq 0 \) from Assumption 2.

**Lemma 4.** If \( \gamma \leq \rho + \z \frac{q'(z)}{g(z)} \psi(z) \), then Property 1 holds.

The proof is in the Appendix. This sufficient condition imposes a joint restriction on \( \alpha \), \( \tau \), and \( G \). Although not readily interpreted, it can be useful to check if Property 1 is satisfied. If \( z \) follows a uniform distribution, for example, this condition holds if and only if

\(^{33}\)If \( \alpha = 1/2 \), for example, the system of equations in (7) has a closed-form solution. However, the formulas are too convoluted, since it requires to solve a third degree polynomial equation. Hence, I solve this system numerically in Section 4.
\[ \tau \leq 1 - \left( \frac{3\alpha}{2\alpha + 1} \right)^{\frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha}}. \] Notice that even if this condition is violated, Property 1 still can be attained.

Finally, one last assumption is needed to characterize the optimal mechanism.

**Assumption 3.** If \( B(z_1) < c \) then \( z_1 \geq z_2 \).

Provided that \( z_2 > z_1 \), Assumption 3 guarantees that \( z_3 \leq z_1 \), which is sufficient to characterize the optimal allocation for \( z \leq z_3 \). In particular, for \( z \leq z_3 \), the optimal allocation has the same closed-form as the solution in Proposition 2 for \( z \leq z_1 \). Importantly, this assumption is far from being restrictive. A sufficient condition, for example, is that \( B(z) \) single crosses \( c \).

The cases depicted in the second and third column of Figure 2 illustrate the following proposition.

**Proposition 3.** If \( z_2 > z_1 \) (that is, \( c < \max_{s \in [z_1,z]} B(s) \)) and Property 1 is satisfied, then

\[
\begin{align*}
n^o(z) &= \begin{cases} 
(1 - \tau)^{\frac{1}{\alpha}} (\alpha p z)^{\frac{1}{1-\alpha}} & \text{if } z \leq z < z_3 \\
\hat{n}(z) & \text{if } z_3 \leq z < z_2 \\
(\alpha p \left[z - h(z)\right])^{\frac{1}{1-\alpha}} & \text{if } z_2 \leq z \leq z_3
\end{cases} \\
\phi^o(z) &= \begin{cases} 
0 & \text{if } z \leq z < z_3 \\
\hat{\phi}(z) & \text{if } z_3 \leq z < z_2 \\
0 & \text{if } z_2 \leq z \leq z_3
\end{cases} \\
U^o(z) &= \begin{cases} 
0 & \text{if } z \leq z < z_2 \\
p \int_{z_2}^{z} \left[ (\alpha p [s - h(s)])^{\frac{1}{1-\alpha}} - (1 - \tau)(\alpha p s)^{\frac{1}{1-\alpha}} \right] ds & \text{if } z_2 \leq z \leq z_3
\end{cases} \\
\lambda(z) &= \begin{cases} 
-\gamma z g(z) & \text{if } z \leq z < z_3 \\
\hat{\lambda}(z) & \text{if } z_3 \leq z < z_2 \\
G(z) - 1 & \text{if } z_2 \leq z \leq z_3
\end{cases}
\end{align*}
\]

The solution is discontinuous at \( z = z_2 \). In particular, \( n^o(z_2^-) > n^o(z_2^+) \), and \( \phi^o(z_2^-) > \phi^o(z_2^+) = 0 \).

The proof is in the Appendix. The next corollary assumes that \( c \to 0 \), which is depicted in the first column of Figure 2.

**Corollary 1.** If \( c \to 0 \), then

\[
\{n^o(z), \phi^o(z), U^o(z)\}_{z < z_3} \to \{n^*(z), 1/\mu, 0\}_{z < z_3} \cup \{n^*(z), 0, 0\}_{z = z_3}
\]

\[34\text{If } \alpha = 1/2, \text{ as in Section 4, then any } \tau \leq 1/4 \text{ ensures that Property 1 is satisfied.}\]

\[35\text{Indeed, assume by contradiction that } z_3 > z_1. \text{ Hence, using the definition of } z_1 \text{ and } z_3, \text{ one obtains } B(z_1) < c, \text{ which implies that } z_1 \geq z_2.\]
Proof. At $c = 0$, $\hat{\phi}(z) = 1/\mu$, $\hat{n}(z) = n^*(z)$, $\hat{\lambda}(z) = 0$, for all $z$, $z_2 = \bar{z}$, and $z_3 = \bar{z}$.

Finally, I also consider $\tau = 1$, which describes a context in which the principal aims to fully appropriate the agent’s profits. If $\tau = 1$, Assumption 2 is violated, and thus Lemmas 2, 3, and 4, and Proposition 3 are not valid. However, I rely on Property 1 to prove the following proposition.

**Proposition 4.** If $\tau = 1$, then

$$n^o(z) = \begin{cases} n^*(z) & \text{if } \hat{z} \leq z < z_2 \\ (\alpha p[z - h(z)])^{\frac{1}{1-\alpha}} & \text{if } z_2 \leq z \leq \bar{z} \end{cases},$$

$$\phi^o(z) = \begin{cases} 1/\mu & \text{if } \hat{z} \leq z < z_2 \\ 0 & \text{if } z_2 \leq z \leq \bar{z} \end{cases},$$

$$U^o(z) = \begin{cases} 0 & \text{if } \hat{z} \leq z < z_2 \\ p \int_{z_2}^{z} [(\alpha p[s - h(s)])^{\frac{1}{1-\alpha}} - (1-\tau)(\alpha ps)^{\frac{1}{1-\alpha}}] ds & \text{if } z_2 \leq z \leq \bar{z} \end{cases}.$$

The solution is discontinuous at $z = z_2$. In particular, $n^o(z^-_2) > n^o(z^+_2)$ and $\phi^o(z^-_2) > \phi^o(z^+_2) = 0$.

Proof. Since $\tau = 1$, $z_2 \geq z_1$. For $z \geq z_2$, the proof is outlined in the text. If $z_2 = \bar{z}$, the result follows. Assume $z_2 > \bar{z}$. For $z < z_2$, the unique solution of the system of equations in (7) is $\hat{\phi}(z) = 1/\mu$, $\hat{n}(z) = n^*(z)$, and $\hat{\lambda}(z) = -cg(z)/\mu p n^*(z)^{\alpha}$. Since $n^o(z^-_2) > n^o(z^+_2)$, then $\lambda(z^-_2) > \lambda(z^+_2)$ and 8. is satisfied. The remaining conditions follow from Property 1 that implies $\theta(z) \geq 0$ and $U(z) = 0$.36

This is the case discussed in Section 4.1.

## 6 Extensions

To solve the problem, I specify functional forms for five objects: (1) the production technology, $F(z, n, K) = zn^\alpha$, where $K$ is a vector of other inputs; (2) the utility function, $u(y) = y$, where $y$ is income, or equivalently, consumption in a static environment; (3) the penalty function, $M(e) = \mu e$, where $e$ is the amount evaded; (4) the tax schedule, $T(x) = \tau x$; and (5) the audit cost function, $C(z, n) = c$. In this section, I argue whether these assumptions can be modified without substantially changing the results.

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36In this case, Property 1 implies the following assumption on the distribution of types: $g'(z) \geq \left[\frac{1}{z}^{\frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha}} - \frac{\mu p(\alpha p)c^{\frac{1}{1-\alpha}}}{c}\right] g(z)$, for all $z \leq z_2$. In the example, in Section 4, this inequality verifies if and only if $c \leq 8$. 

27
6.1 Production technology

In this section, I discuss two possible generalizations for the production technology. First, I consider a general function of the form \( zf(n) \). Second, I show how to extend the model to accommodate multiple inputs, given that only one is costlessly observable.

6.1.1 General functional form

Recall that Assumptions 1, 2 and 3, which are crucial to prove the results in this paper, depend on the technological parameter \( \alpha \). Consequently, in order to validate Propositions 2 and 3 under a more general production technology, it is necessary to adapt these assumptions.

Assume, for instance, that the production technology takes the form \( zf(n) \), where \( f' > 0 \), \( f'' < 0 \), and \( f(0) = 0 \). By applying the solution method developed in Section 5, one can derive the same qualitative results, but at an expositional cost, as ad-hoc, and somewhat convoluted, restrictions on \( f \), and its derivatives, would be imposed. It is challenging to characterize the optimal mechanism when these restrictions are violated.\(^{37}\) Instead, I opt to explore the Cobb-Douglas case in this paper.

More importantly, although realistic, Assumption 2 restricts the set of values \( \alpha \) can take for a given \( \tau \). Therefore, even for the Cobb-Douglas case, the optimal mechanism is not fully characterized. Before pursuing generalizations for the production technology, it is important to understand how the optimal mechanism behaves if this assumption is relaxed. Proposition 4 is a small step towards this direction. I leave the characterization of the mechanism when Assumption 2 is violated as an open question for further research.

6.1.2 Multiple inputs

In this section, I show how the production technology can be generalized to multiple inputs, as long as only one is costlessly observable by the IRS. Let \( F(z, n, k_1, ..., k_I) = zn^{\alpha_0} \prod_{i=1}^{I} k_i^{\alpha_i} \), where \( \{k_i\}_{i=1}^{I} \) are the inputs that are not observable by the IRS. Assume that \( F \) displays decreasing returns to scale, so \( \sum_{i=0}^{I} \alpha_i < 1 \), and \( \alpha_i \geq 0 \) for \( i = 0, ..., I \). Finally, let \( r_i \) be the price of input \( k_i \), which is bought in a competitive market.

In the Appendix, given that \( \{k_i\}_{i=1}^{I} \) are chosen in the second stage of the game, I show that pre-tax profits can be written as

\[
\pi(n, z) = \zeta(z; p, \{r_i\}, \{\alpha_i\})n^{\alpha} - n, \quad (8)
\]

\(^{37}\)For the specific case of Proposition 2, in which \( c \) is high enough and \( \phi(z) = 0 \) for all \( z \), the problem is isomorphic to a standard mechanism design problem with type-dependent reservation value. Jullien [2000] provides a comprehensive characterization of the optimal mechanism for this case.
where $\alpha = \alpha_0 / \left(1 - \sum_{i=1}^I \alpha_i\right) \in (0, 1)$, and $\zeta$ is a function of $\{\alpha_i\}_{i=1}^I$, $\{r_i\}_{i=1}^I$, $p$, and $z$. Consequently, the distribution of $z$, $G$, induces a distribution of $\zeta$, say $\hat{G}$, and the mechanism developed above can be applied directly to $\zeta$. However, Assumptions 1 and 3, and Property 1 need to be restated in terms of $\zeta$ and $\hat{G}$. It is important to keep in mind that, although pre-tax profits are $\zeta n^\alpha - n$, the output produced is not $\zeta n^\alpha$.

This extension is useful in Section 7, where I pursue an empirical evaluation of the mechanism developed in this paper, for two reasons. First, it accounts for a more realistic production technology. Second, if $z$ is either log-normally or paretian distributed, which are commonly assumed in the literature, then also $\zeta$ is.

### 6.2 Audit cost

Without compelling empirical evidence, it is hard to inspect the shape of the audit cost, $C(z, n)$. It can be argued, for instance, that large firms take longer to monitor than smaller firms, which justifies $\frac{\partial C}{\partial n} \geq 0$. On the other hand, there may be a visibility effect that reduces the informational cost associated with monitoring larger firms, hence it is also plausible that $\frac{\partial C}{\partial n} \leq 0$.

Similarly, for a high-ability entrepreneur, it could be easier to circumvent the law, and hide her income, making $\frac{\partial C}{\partial z} \geq 0$. On the other hand, if high-ability translates into more complex business operations, the need to use of accounting books could make $\frac{\partial C}{\partial z} \leq 0$. On this line, as Kleven et al. [2009] argue, if these books are known to many employees, because of whistleblowing rewards, the firm is less likely to hide them successfully from the IRS, so $\frac{\partial C}{\partial n \partial z} \leq 0$.

Consequently, I adopt an agnostic view about the audit cost. In particular, I look for restrictions on its partial derivatives that are sufficient to support the qualitative results from the previous section.

For simplicity, I assume that the concavity of the Hamiltonian with respect to $n$ is preserved.\footnote{A sufficient condition is $\frac{\partial^2 C}{\partial n^2} \geq 0$.} Hence, from the set of sufficient conditions for an optimum, only items 1. and 2. change.

1'. \[ z + (1 - \mu \tau \phi^0(z)) \frac{\lambda(z)}{g(z)} \alpha p n^\alpha(z)^{\alpha - 1} = 1 + \frac{\partial C}{\partial n}(z, n^\alpha(z)) \phi(z) \]

2'. \[ C(z, n^\alpha(z)) g(z) + \lambda(z) \mu \tau p n^\alpha(z)^{\alpha} = \omega(z) \]

Note that the definition of $z_1$ does not change, but $z_2$ needs to be redefined.\footnote{In particular, $z_2 = \sup_{s \in [\lambda, z]} \{B(s) < C(s, (\alpha p[s - h(s)])^{\frac{1}{\alpha}})\}$.}
It is easy to verify that Proposition 2, which assumes $z_1 \geq z_2$, would still be valid whenever the LHS of $2'$ is greater than or equal to zero for all $z \leq z_1$. A sufficient condition for this is

$$z \frac{\partial C}{\partial n}(z, n^o(z)) \frac{dn^o}{dz}(z) + z \frac{\partial C}{\partial z}(z, n^o(z)) \leq \frac{1}{1 - \alpha} \frac{\mu \tau}{\alpha} \gamma (1 - \tau) (\alpha pz)^{\frac{1}{1 - \alpha}}.$$

If $z_2 \geq z_1$, for $z \in [z_3, z_2]$, the optimal mechanism solves the system of equations in (7). To account for a general audit cost, the first and second equations in (7) need to be substituted for $1'$ and $2'$, (with $\omega(z) = 0$). A close inspection of the Appendix, especially the proofs of Lemmas 2 and 3, reveals that the extra term $\frac{\partial C}{\partial n}(z, n^o(z)) \phi(z)$ in $1'$ complicates the characterization of the mechanism. Hence, I set $\frac{\partial C}{\partial n} = 0$, and study the case in which the audit cost $C$ depends only on $z$. Note that $z_3$ also needs to be redefined.\textsuperscript{40}

Under the additional assumption that $zC''(z) \leq \frac{1}{1 - \alpha} C(z)$, one can follow the steps in Section 5, and verify that the characterization of the mechanism is qualitatively the same. Note that this assumption can accommodate a non-monotone audit cost.

If $zC''(z) > \frac{1}{1 - \alpha} C(z)$ at some range, the characterization of the mechanism would be more complicated. Intuitively, if the cost to audit increases at a high rate, the IRS might prefer to save audits expenses by following a non-monotone monitoring strategy on $[z_3, z_2]$.

### 6.3 Tax schedule

By imposing a tax schedule of the form $T(x) = \tau x$, I rule out possible interactions between the progressiveness of the tax system and the optimal monitoring strategy. The simplest way to introduce progressiveness in the model, without changing the characterization of the optimal mechanism, is to assume that $T(x) = \tau_o + \tau x$, with $\tau_o < 0$. The only difference, from the original formulation, is that net revenue collection is increasing on $\tau_o$.

Consider a general tax schedule $T$, twice continuous differentiable. In particular, $T' \in [0, 1)$ and $T'' > 0$. For simplicity, I assume that the concavity of the Hamiltonian with respect to $n$ is preserved. From the set of sufficient conditions for an optimum, the first order condition with respect to $n$ become

$$\left[ z + (1 - \mu T_o'(z) \phi^o(z)) \frac{\lambda(z)}{g(z)} \right] \alpha p n^o(z)^{\alpha - 1} = 1 + \mu T_o''(z) \phi^o(z) \frac{\lambda(z)}{g(z)} \left[ \alpha pn^o(z)^{\alpha - 1} - 1 \right] pn^o(z)^\alpha,$$

where $T_i(z) = T(\pi(n^i(z), z))$, $T'_i(z) = T'(\pi(n^i(z), z))$, and $T''_i(z) = T''(\pi(n^i(z), z))$, for $i = o, \ast$. Unfortunately, $n^o$ enters this expression in a convoluted way, jeopardizing any

\textsuperscript{40}In particular, $z_3 = \sup_{s \in [z_3, z_2]} \{ \frac{\mu \tau}{\alpha} (1 - \tau) (\alpha ps)^{\frac{1}{1 - \alpha}} < C(s) \}$.
attempt to extend the analytical results in Proposition 3 for a general tax schedule.

However, if \( c \) is high enough, such that \( \phi^o(z) = 0 \) for all \( z \), an analogous proposition to Proposition 2, in which \( T^*(z) \) plays the role of \( \tau \), can be derived. In this case, \( z_1 \) can be defined in a similar way, and for \( z \leq z_1 \), \( \lambda(z) = -\gamma(z) zg(z) \), where \( \gamma(z) = [1 - (1 - T^*(z))^{1/\alpha}] \). The crucial step is to show that \( \frac{d\lambda}{dz}(z) \leq g(z) \), which is true under the assumptions that \( T' \in [0, 1) \), \( T'' > 0 \), and \( h(z) \) is non-increasing.

6.4 Penalty and utility functions

Linear penalties and risk neutrality are the hardest assumptions to relax. Consider linear penalties, for instance. Under the assumption that the penalty function, \( M \), is differentiable, the local incentive compatibility constraint can be rewritten as

\[
\frac{dU}{dz}(z) = (1 - \phi(z)M'(e(z))\tau)pn(z)^{\alpha} - (1 - \tau)pn^*(z)^{\alpha}, \ a.e.,
\]

where \( e(z) = \tau(\pi(n(z), z) - x(z)) \). If \( M'(e) \) depended on \( e \), the IRS problem could not be rewritten in terms of the informational rents \( U \), since \( x \) would still pop out in the Hamiltonian. However, this trick substantially facilitates the use of optimal control techniques in order to solve the problem. A similar argument can be developed for risk neutrality.41

7 A quantitative exploration

The message of this paper is that the IRS can increase net revenue if it is willing to impose distortions almost everywhere. Hence, in order to inform policy, it is desirable to quantify this trade-off.

Ideally, one would like to embed the IRS actual practiced monitoring strategy into a general model, and use data on reported profits, actual profits, inputs, and audits to pin down the distribution of managerial ability, and the parameters of the model, such as the audit cost \( c \) or the penalty \( \mu \). Thus, it would be possible to counterfactually assess the implications of the mechanism developed in this paper.

However, this approach poses two challenges. First, in most countries, including the U.S., the audit scheme is strictly guarded or too obscure.42 Hence, it cannot be used as a

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41 In a standard mechanism design problem, the principal’s objective is usually written in terms of informational rents, instead of compensatory transfers. Consequently, transfers can not pop out in the set of local incentive compatibility constraints. This is obtained under the commonly used assumption that utility is quasi-linear in transfers. In this paper, both linear penalties and risk neutrality allow reported income to play a similar role to transfers.

42 Andreoni et al. [1998] describe how audit policy is conducted in the U.S. for individual income tax
benchmark. Second, even in countries where the tax collection agency commits to a publicly known monitoring strategy, such as in Italy, the lack of public data limits this approach. Hence, in order to provide some assessment on the trade-off between revenue collection and efficiency, I follow an alternative approach. In particular, I focus on the potential revenue gains from adopting the optimal mechanism. Let $R^o$ be the revenue collection generated by the optimal mechanism, and $R^a$ be the actual revenue collected by the U.S. IRS from some set of self-employed entrepreneurs. I establish a lower bound to $R^o/R^a$.

### 7.1 Back-of-the-envelope calculation

Let $Y^i$ and $X^i$, $i = a, o, \ast$, be aggregate pre-tax profits and reported income, respectively. Again, $a$ stands for the actual figures, $o$ for the optimal mechanism outcome, and $\ast$ for the full-information outcome, in which production is carried out efficiently. Notice that $Y^\ast \geq \max\{Y^a, Y^o\}$. Moreover, let $rep^i \equiv X^i/Y^i$ be the fraction of aggregate income that is reported to the IRS. Finally, let $\bar{\phi}$ be the maximum probability that a firm is actually audited by the U.S. IRS. Consequently,

\[
\frac{R^o}{R^a} \equiv \frac{\tau X^o + \int \phi^o(z)[\mu\tau(\pi(n^o(z), z) - x^o(z))] - c]dG(z)}{\tau X^a + \int \phi^a(z)[\mu\tau(\pi(n^a(z), z) - x^a(z))] - c]dG(z)} \geq \frac{X^o}{X^a + \mu\bar{\phi}(Y^a - X^a)} = \frac{\text{rep}^o \times \frac{Y^o}{Y^a}}{\text{rep}^a + \mu\bar{\phi}(1 - \text{rep}^a)} \geq \frac{\text{rep}^o \times \frac{Y^o}{Y^a}}{\text{rep}^a + \mu\bar{\phi}(1 - \text{rep}^a)}.
\]

The RHS of (9) is a lower bound to $R^o/R^a$. Since information on $\mu$, $\bar{\phi}$, and $\text{rep}^o$ can be gathered, it remains to calculate $\text{rep}^o$ and $Y^o/Y^\ast$, which I turn next.

### 7.2 Calculating $Y^\ast$, $Y^o$, and $\text{rep}^o$

Recall, from Section 6.1, that the model accommodates a production technology of the form $zn^{\alpha_0} \prod_{i=1}^{I} k_i^{\alpha_i}$, as long as only labor $n$ is observable. Consequently, pre-tax profits can be rewritten as

$$
\zeta(z; p, \{r_i\}_{i=1}^{I}, \{\alpha_i\}_{i=1}^{I})n^\alpha - n,
$$

returns. In a first stage, intensive audits are conducted on a stratified random sample. Then, these results are used to assess the likelihood that a report contains evasion. Slightly over one-half of all audit selections are based at least partly on this method. However, the rules used to assign each report a likelihood that it contains irregularities are strictly guarded.

\[\text{In Italy, presumed sales proceeds are statistically inferred from easily observable variables, like surface area of offices and warehouses, number of employees, type of customers, and so on. In particular, a small or medium sized firm can be audited if it reports sales proceeds that are lower than a presumed level. See Arachi and Santoro [2007] and Santoro [2008] for more details.}\]
where $\alpha = \alpha_0 / \left(1 - \sum_{i=1}^{I} \alpha_i \right) \in (0, 1)$, and $\zeta$ is a function of the prices, the technological parameters, and the managerial ability. Importantly, if $z$ follows a truncated Pareto distribution, which is assumed from now on, also $\zeta$ does. Let $\beta$ be the shape parameter of $\zeta$’s underlying distribution, which has support $[\underline{\zeta}, \overline{\zeta}]$.

To calculate $Y^*, Y^o$, and $rep^o$, I follow a similar approach to Guner et al. [2008] analysis of policies that depend on the firm size. In particular, I assume that the U.S. is a “relatively free-distortion” competitive economy, and use employment data to impose some discipline on the distribution of managerial ability. By relatively free-distortion, I mean an economy in which policies do not target the firm size. By competitive, I mean an economy in which entrepreneurs take prices as given and maximize expected profits. Hence,

$$n^*(\zeta) = (\alpha \zeta)^{1/\alpha}. \quad (10)$$

Note that distortions that do not target the firm size, such as an input tax, are innocuous. Indeed, on top of prices, technological parameters, and managerial ability, $\zeta$ would also absorb these distortions.

Importantly, I am implicitly assuming that either the actual monitoring strategy does not depend on labor input (or any other proxy for the firm size), or entrepreneurs do not internalize it whenever they take decisions. Although it is likely that the IRS use information on the business size to select audits, many authors have argued that taxpayers have a poor knowledge of the audit function. In particular, they tend to overestimate the probability of an IRS audit. See, for example, Andreoni et al. [1998].

Define $\eta \equiv 1 - \sum_{i=0}^{I} \alpha_i$, which is the share of output that goes to the entrepreneur as pre-tax profits, so $\alpha = \alpha_0 / (\alpha_0 + \eta)$. By calibrating $\eta$, $\alpha_0$, $\zeta$, $\overline{\zeta}$, and $\beta$, I can combine data on employment at each firm with equation (10) to back out empirically the distribution of $\zeta$, say $\hat{G}$, and then calculate the full-information aggregate profits, $Y^* \equiv \int [\zeta n^*(\zeta) - n^*(\zeta)] d\hat{G}(\zeta)$.

To calculate $Y^o$ and $rep^o$, and thus generate the counterfactual, I make three additional assumptions. First, I rule out general equilibrium effects through prices, that is I assume $p$ and $\{r_i\}_{i=1}^I$ are fixed. Second, I assume the distribution of occupations is fixed, such that entrepreneurs are not allowed to become workers, and vice-versa. Finally, I assume $c$ is high enough, such that firms are not monitored in equilibrium, and thus the optimal mechanism is the one derived in Proposition 2.

The first and second assumptions make the distribution of $\zeta$, $\hat{G}$, invariant to policy. Hence, the optimal mechanism can be directly applied to $\hat{G}$, which was backed out from employment data in a previous step.

If the demand for inputs in the corporate sector is relatively large, once compared with
the set of firms considered in this exercise, general equilibrium effects through prices is a minor issue. Moreover, given prices are fixed and, due to withholding or third-party report, labor taxes are fully enforced without cost, then the possibility to move across occupations would further increase net revenue. Indeed, once adopted, the optimal mechanism reduces profits in entrepreneurial sector. Hence, a standard occupational choice model would predict more workers fully complying with taxes, and less entrepreneurs managing firms.

The third assumption allows me to calculate the optimal mechanism without specifying values for the audit cost $c$ and the linear penalty $\mu$. Moreover, by setting a high enough $c$, since only labor distortions are used in equilibrium, this assumption underestimate the net revenue gains from adopting the optimal mechanism.

Consequently, these three assumptions reinforce the aim of this exercise in providing and lower bound to $R^\circ/R^a$.

### 7.3 Calibration

Following Guner et al. [2008], I set $\eta = 0.2$, and $\alpha_0 = (1 - \eta) \times 0.6$.

To calibrate $\zeta$, $\bar{\zeta}$, and $\beta$, I use data on employment and entrepreneurship from the 2001 Survey of Consumer Finance (SCF). In particular, I restrict the sample to families, in which one member actively manages and owns only one business, as in the theory presented above, and employs at least one worker. I consider only nonfarm sole-proprietors. This procedure leads to 825 observations.

Table 1 shows some descriptive statistics for the number of workers at each firm.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th># workers</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>St. dev.</th>
<th>Min</th>
<th>Max</th>
<th>Obs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6.92</td>
<td>26.68</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>299</td>
<td>825</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1: Descriptive statistics (weighted). Source: SCF 2001.

I set $\zeta = 1.42$ and $\bar{\zeta} = 7.58$, which implies $n^*(\zeta) = 1$ and $n^*(\bar{\zeta}) = 299$, as in the sample. Similarly, $\beta = 3.07$ generates the average employment per firm in the data. Table 2 shows that this simple strategy matches reasonably well the firm size distribution observed in the data.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th># workers</th>
<th>[0,5)</th>
<th>[5,10)</th>
<th>[10,20)</th>
<th>[20,100)</th>
<th>[100,299]</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Data</td>
<td>80.0%</td>
<td>13.1%</td>
<td>2.9%</td>
<td>2.5%</td>
<td>1.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Model</td>
<td>77.1%</td>
<td>10.9%</td>
<td>5.9%</td>
<td>5.2%</td>
<td>1.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2: Firm size distribution in data (weighted) and in the model. Source: SCF 2001.
Efficient aggregate profits, \( Y^* \), is 14.4, which is reasonable once wages are the numeraire. Under the assumptions stated above, to calculate \( Y^o \) and \( rep^o \), I need to specify a value for \( \tau \), and then use the formulas from Proposition 2.\(^{44}\)

Piketty and Saez [2007] documents that the average federal individual income tax rate was 11.5% in 2004. If payroll taxes are added, the tax rate increases to 20.8%. Since this figure ignores both local and state taxes, I generate results for \( \tau \) ranging from 0.15 to 0.35.

I turn to the choice of \( \mu \) and \( \bar{\phi} \). According to the U.S. code, title 26,6663, “if any part of any underpayment of tax required to be shown on a return is due to fraud, there shall be added to the tax an amount equal to 75 percent of the portion of the underpayment which is attributable to fraud.” However, typically, penalties are assessed at a rate of 20 percent of the amount underpaid (Andreoni et al. [1998]).

Similarly, the IRS does not seem to rely on an intensive use of audits to enforce taxes. Indeed, according to the 2001 IRS Data Book, less than 2% of the schedule C returns were audited.\(^{45}\) Hence, setting \( \mu \bar{\phi} = 0.1 \) seems a conservative choice, although I also generate results for \( \mu \bar{\phi} \) ranging from 0.05 to 0.25.\(^{46}\)

It is worth mention that if non-pecuniary penalties, such as the possibility of imprisonment, were properly accounted for in the model, \( R^o/R^a \) would increase even more. The same argument is valid for other types of cost, such as the financial cost of hiring professional assistance or the moral cost of being an outlaw.

Finally, following Slemrod [2007], I set \( rep^o = 0.43 \), which is the fraction of nonfarm sole-proprietor income that is reported to the IRS in 2001. This figure is provided by the IRS, which combines information from a program of random intensive audits, ongoing enforcement activities, and other special studies about particular sources of income (such as cash earnings) that is unlikely to be uncover even in an intensive audit. Alternatively, I also generate results for \( rep^o = 0.65 \), which is estimated by Feldman and Slemrod [2007] using unaudited tax returns data for 1999 in the U.S. Under the assumption that charity donations are unrelated to the source of income, these authors adapt the econometric approach in Pissarides and Weber [1989] to estimate self-employment income underreporting.\(^{47}\)

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\(^{44}\)Given the values chosen for the parameters, the truncated Pareto distribution does not satisfy Assumption 1. However, for the purpose of this empirical exercise, an inspection of the proof of Proposition 2 reveals that this assumption can be relaxed as follows: 1. \( z - h(z) \) is non-decreasing for \( z \geq z_1 \); 2. \( \gamma z - h(z) \leq 0 \) for \( z \leq z_1 \); and 3. \(-\gamma g(z) + zg'(z) \leq g(z)\) for \( z \leq z_1 \). These properties are satisfied in this section.

\(^{45}\)Schedule C returns are those filled by nonfarm self-employed.

\(^{46}\)Even if some taxpayers face high probabilities of being audited, by plugging a smaller value for \( \bar{\phi} \), it is still likely that the inequality in (9) is satisfied, especially if these taxpayers represent a small fraction of the population.

\(^{47}\)In their original approach, Pissarides and Weber [1989] assume that food consumption, instead of charity donations, is unrelated to the source of income. These authors estimate that income underreporting for British self-employed was approximately 35% in 1982.
7.4 Results

Table 3 displays the results for \( rep^o = 0.43 \). It reports the lower bound to \( R^o/R^a \), that is the RHS of (9).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>( \tau )</th>
<th>( rep^o )</th>
<th>( \frac{\gamma^o}{\beta^o} )</th>
<th>( \tilde{\phi}\mu = 0.05 )</th>
<th>( \tilde{\phi}\mu = 0.10 )</th>
<th>( \tilde{\phi}\mu = 0.15 )</th>
<th>( \tilde{\phi}\mu = 0.20 )</th>
<th>( \tilde{\phi}\mu = 0.25 )</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>0.91</td>
<td>0.98</td>
<td>1.95</td>
<td>1.83</td>
<td>1.73</td>
<td>1.64</td>
<td>1.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>0.88</td>
<td>0.97</td>
<td>1.87</td>
<td>1.76</td>
<td>1.66</td>
<td>1.57</td>
<td>1.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>0.86</td>
<td>0.96</td>
<td>1.79</td>
<td>1.68</td>
<td>1.59</td>
<td>1.51</td>
<td>1.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.30</td>
<td>0.83</td>
<td>0.94</td>
<td>1.71</td>
<td>1.61</td>
<td>1.52</td>
<td>1.44</td>
<td>1.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.35</td>
<td>0.81</td>
<td>0.92</td>
<td>1.62</td>
<td>1.53</td>
<td>1.45</td>
<td>1.37</td>
<td>1.30</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3: Results for \( rep^o = 0.43 \).

A very conservative choice of the parameters indicates substantial gains, in terms of net revenue, from adopting the optimal mechanism. If \( \tau = 0.25 \) and \( \tilde{\phi}\mu = 0.15 \), for instance, net revenue collection from this set of firms would increase at least by 59%. For nonfarm proprietor business income, \( rep^o = 0.43 \) is associated with a tax gap of U$ 68 billion, as reported in Slemrod [2007].\(^{48}\) Consequently, the extra revenue collected could potentially be U$ 30 billion, or equivalently, 3% of the total federal individual income taxes collected in 2001.\(^{49}\) Interestingly, even in the worst scenario, that is \( \tau = 0.35 \) and \( rep^o = 0.81 \), the degree of evasion is substantially lower than the one observed in the data.

Table 4 displays the results for \( rep^o = 0.65 \). As expected, the gains from adopting the mechanism are smaller, but still potentially large. For example, if \( \tau = 0.2 \) and \( \tilde{\phi}\mu = 0.10 \), net revenue collection from this set of firms would increase by 25%.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>( \tau )</th>
<th>( rep^o )</th>
<th>( \frac{\gamma^o}{\beta^o} )</th>
<th>( \tilde{\phi}\mu = 0.05 )</th>
<th>( \tilde{\phi}\mu = 0.10 )</th>
<th>( \tilde{\phi}\mu = 0.15 )</th>
<th>( \tilde{\phi}\mu = 0.20 )</th>
<th>( \tilde{\phi}\mu = 0.25 )</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>0.91</td>
<td>0.98</td>
<td>1.34</td>
<td>1.30</td>
<td>1.27</td>
<td>1.24</td>
<td>1.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>0.88</td>
<td>0.97</td>
<td>1.28</td>
<td>1.25</td>
<td>1.22</td>
<td>1.19</td>
<td>1.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>0.86</td>
<td>0.96</td>
<td>1.23</td>
<td>1.20</td>
<td>1.17</td>
<td>1.14</td>
<td>1.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>0.83</td>
<td>0.94</td>
<td>1.17</td>
<td>1.14</td>
<td>1.11</td>
<td>1.09</td>
<td>1.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35</td>
<td>0.81</td>
<td>0.92</td>
<td>1.12</td>
<td>1.09</td>
<td>1.06</td>
<td>1.03</td>
<td>1.01</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4: Results for \( rep^o = 0.65 \).

\(^{48}\)A tax gap of U$ 68 billion only accounts for individual federal income tax, ignoring payroll, local, and state taxes.

\(^{49}\)Of course a tax gap of U$68 billion aggregates the tax gap across heterogenous classes of entrepreneurs, including those that usually do not hire workers, such as independent contractors. Consequently, the potential U$ 30 billion extra revenue should be viewed as an imperfect aggregator across classes, given that optimal monitoring strategies were designed for each class based on a single observable input.
In the Appendix, I do some sensitivity analysis. In particular, I vary both $\beta$ and $\alpha$. Results are remarkably robust to variations of $\beta$, but net revenue collected would increase even more for higher values of $\alpha$.

Leaving aside explanations based on moral, psychological, or social reasonings, the discrepancy between the model and the data highlights the inability of the IRS to deter evasion through audits. In particular, given that in the U.S., the IRS strategy to select audits is strictly guarded, these results suggest that the IRS can substantially fight evasion, and thus increase revenue collection, by committing to an optimal monitoring strategy that depends on proxies for the business size. Recall that this exercise assumes that $c$ is high enough, such that in equilibrium, $\phi^o(z) = 0$ for all $z$, and thus these results do not rely on an abusive use of audits, which is consistent with the IRS actual practices.

The adoption of such rule raises other issues, such as the distortions it imposes almost everywhere, or its implications for horizontal equity. From an ethical point of view, it would be questionable an IRS behavior that not only tolerates, but also explicitly induces evasion.

Of course this exercise is somewhat limited, as general equilibrium and occupational choice effects are ruled out, and the assumption that policies do not target firm size might not be the right benchmark. Moreover, non-linearities on the tax schedule have implications for both the optimal mechanism, and the actual revenue collected by the U.S. IRS. Nonetheless, this exercise provides a first assessment on the potential gains from optimally conditioning the monitoring strategy on employment.

8 Conclusion

The relevance of the theory presented in this paper hinges on the plausibility of two assumptions. First, employment at each firm is easily observable by the IRS. Second, audits are relevant to explain self-employed income tax evasion.

At least in developed countries, to a first approximation, there is empirical evidence suggesting that labor is readily available information to the IRS. In particular, only 1 percent of wages and salaries are not reported to the IRS in the U.S. (Slemrod [2007]), and even less in Denmark (Kleven et al. [2010]). If income taxes are subject to third-party report, as in the case of employers withholding wage taxes, it is unlikely that the parties involved would collude to evade taxes. Moreover, as long as wages are partially declared, the IRS still has information about the employee and the firm for which she works. Even if unskilled

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50 In the U.S., for instance, firms issue W-2 forms, one for each worker, detailing her identity and the amount of wages paid. Each form is sent to the IRS and the relevant employee. The latter uses the W-2 form to file her income tax return. See Logue and Slemrod [2009] for more details.

51 In particular, a computer program that matches reports from both workers and firms is enough. Hence,
workers, such as illegal immigrants, can be easily hidden, the extension in Section 6.1 shows that the optimal mechanism can be applied as long as a single input is easily observable. Examples of such input are skilled labor or an intermediate good bought from a formal firm.

What if other reasons, rather than audits, are the main determinants of self-employed income tax evasion? Entrepreneurs, for example, might be caught in a web of business-to-business transactions that facilitate enforcement for tax reasons.\textsuperscript{52} Similarly, access to the financial sector generates information that can be used by the IRS to enforce taxes (Gordon and Li [2009]). Finally, when the use of accounting books, necessary to run complex business operations, are known to many employees, the entrepreneur is less likely to hide them successfully from the IRS (Kleven et al. [2009]).

Nonetheless, evidence from field experiments, in which auditing probabilities are exogenously controlled, suggests that audits have a strong impact on self-reported income. See Slemrod et al. [2001] for an experiment in the U.S., and Kleven et al. [2010] for another in Denmark. Moreover, Slemrod [2007] documents that in 2001, 57 percent of nonfarm proprietor income should have been reported to the IRS, or equivalently, $68 billion should have been paid out as income taxes.\textsuperscript{53} Therefore, at least among nonfarm proprietors, whose income is mostly self-reported, the design of optimal monitoring strategies can play an important role to increase revenue collection, as the exercise in Section 7 highlights.

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item[\textsuperscript{52}] For example, whenever a downstream firm buys from an upstream firm, value-added taxes along the production chain generate tax credits to be used against future tax liabilities. Thus, this transaction is observable by the IRS, and compliant firms have an incentive to deal among themselves (Kopczuk and Slemrod [2006] and de Paula and Scheinkman [forthcoming]).
\item[\textsuperscript{53}] In 2001, this figure amounts to approximately 0.7% of the GDP, 3.4% of total federal revenue, 5.9% of total federal income taxes collected, and 6.8% of total federal individual income taxes collected. These numbers would be larger if the tax gap associated with payroll, state, and local taxes was be accounted for.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
A Proofs

The following proofs involve a change of variables that reduces the number of equations in (7). Define $\Phi \equiv 1 - \mu \tau \phi$ and $N \equiv n^\alpha$. Using the first and the second equations to eliminate $\lambda$ from the problem, one reaches the following system of two equations in two unknowns ($\Phi$ and $N$).

\[
\Phi = \frac{\mu \tau}{\alpha c} \left[ \alpha pz N - N^{\frac{1}{\alpha}} \right] \tag{11}
\]

\[
\Phi = \frac{(1 - \tau)(\alpha p z)^{\frac{\alpha}{1 - \alpha}}}{N}
\]

Moreover, $\phi \in [0, 1/\mu]$ implies that $\Phi \in [1 - \tau, 1]$.

Let $\Phi_1(N) = \frac{\mu \tau}{\alpha c}[(\alpha p z) N - N^{\frac{1}{\alpha}}]$, $\Phi_2(N) = \frac{(1 - \tau)(\alpha p z)^{\frac{\alpha}{1 - \alpha}}}{N}$, and define $N^* \equiv (\alpha p z)^{\frac{\alpha}{1 - \alpha}}$. Since $\Phi_2$ is strictly decreasing, then any solution to this system implies that $N \in [(1 - \tau)N^*, N^*]$.

A.1 Proof of Lemma 2

Notice that $\Phi_1$ is strictly concave, and $\Phi_2$ is strictly convex. Therefore, $\Phi_1 = \Phi_2$ at most at two values of $N$. Moreover, $\Phi_1(N^*) = 0 < (1 - \tau) = \Phi_2(N^*)$, thus this system has one solution if $\Phi_1((1 - \tau)N^*) > \Phi_2((1 - \tau)N^*) = 1$. A little algebra shows that this requirement holds if and only if $c < \frac{\mu \tau}{\alpha}[(1 - \tau) - (1 - \tau)\frac{1}{\alpha}]\left(\alpha p z \right)^{\frac{1}{1 - \alpha}}$.

This system does not have a solution if and only if $\Phi_1(N) < \Phi_2(N)$ for all $N \in [(1 - \tau)N^*, N^*]$. Note that $\Phi_1(N) < \Phi_2(N)$ if and only if

\[
\frac{\mu \tau[\alpha p z N^2 - N^{\frac{1 + \alpha}{\alpha}}]}{\alpha(1 - \tau)(\alpha p z)^{\frac{\alpha}{1 - \alpha}}} < c
\]

Taking the first order condition of the LHS with respect to $N$, one gets $\hat{N} = \frac{2}{1+\alpha} \alpha p z$. But Assumption 2 implies that $\hat{N} \leq (1 - \tau)N^*$. Hence, there are two possible candidates for a maximum: $(1 - \tau)N^*$ and $N^*$. Plugging them into the LHS, and choosing the one that yields the highest value, one concludes that this system does not have a solution if and only if $\frac{\mu \tau}{\alpha}[(1 - \tau) - (1 - \tau)\frac{1}{\alpha}]\left(\alpha p z \right)^{\frac{1}{1 - \alpha}} < c$.

Finally, when $\hat{c} = \frac{\mu \tau}{\alpha}[(1 - \tau) - (1 - \tau)\frac{1}{\alpha}]\left(\alpha p z \right)^{\frac{1}{1 - \alpha}}$, $N = (1 - \tau)N^*$ and $\Phi = 1$ is the only solution to the system of equations above.
A.2 Proof of Lemma 3

Items 1., 4. and 5. are immediate. Item 2. follows from the fact that \( c = \frac{\mu \tau}{\alpha} [(1 - \tau) - (1 - \tau)^{\frac{\alpha}{\alpha}}] \), thus \( N(z_3) = (1 - \tau)N^*(z_3) \) and \( \Phi(z_3) = 1 \). It remains to show 3., that is \( \frac{dN}{dz} \geq 0 \) and \( \frac{d\Phi}{dz} \leq 0 \).

Equalizing both equations in (11), one obtains

\[
\alpha pzN^2 - N^{1+\frac{1}{\alpha}} = \frac{\alpha c}{\mu \tau} (1 - \tau)(\alpha pz)^{\frac{1}{1-\alpha}}.
\]

Differentiating it with respect to \( N \) and \( z \) leads to

\[
\frac{dN}{dz} = \frac{(1 - \tau) \alpha c \cdot \alpha - (\alpha pz)^{\frac{1}{1-\alpha}}}{\alpha pz2N - \frac{1+\alpha}{\alpha} N^{\frac{1}{\alpha}}}.\]

For \( \frac{dN}{dz} \geq 0 \), it is enough to show that both the denominator and the numerator are negative. Indeed, the numerator is smaller then zero if and only if

\[
(1 - \tau) \frac{\alpha c}{\mu \tau} \frac{\alpha}{1 - \alpha} - \alpha pN^2 < 0.
\]

Therefore, by plugging the smallest possible value for \( N \), \( (1 - \tau)N^* \), and after some manipulations,

\[
c < \frac{1 - \alpha}{\alpha} (1 - \tau) \frac{\mu \tau}{\alpha} (\alpha pz)^{\frac{1}{1-\alpha}}.
\]

Since \( c \leq \frac{\mu \tau}{\alpha} [(1 - \tau) - (1 - \tau)^{\frac{\alpha}{\alpha}}](\alpha pz)^{\frac{1}{1-\alpha}} \), it is enough to show that

\[
1 - (1 - \tau)^{\frac{1}{1-\alpha}} < \frac{1 - \alpha}{\alpha},
\]

which follows from Assumption 2.

The denominator is smaller then zero if and only if

\[
\alpha pz2N - \frac{1+\alpha}{\alpha} N^{\frac{1}{\alpha}} \leq 0 \iff \alpha pz \cdot \frac{\alpha}{1 + \alpha} \leq N^{\frac{1}{\alpha} - \frac{\alpha}{\alpha}}.
\]

Hence, it is enough to plug the smallest possible value for \( N \), \( (1 - \tau)N^* \), into this inequality, and check that it holds. Indeed,

\[
2 \cdot \frac{\alpha}{1 + \alpha} \leq (1 - \tau)^{\frac{1}{1-\alpha}}
\]

is true by Assumption 2.
Similarly, from (11),
\[
\Phi = \frac{\mu \tau}{\alpha c} \left( (1 - \tau) \frac{(\alpha p z)^{\frac{1}{1-\alpha}}}{\Phi^{\frac{1}{2}}} - (1 - \tau)^{\frac{1}{\alpha}} \frac{(\alpha p z)^{\frac{1}{1-\alpha}}}{\Phi^{\frac{1}{2}}} \right)
\]
Differentiating it with respect to \(\Phi\) and \(z\), and after some manipulation, leads to
\[
\frac{d\Phi}{dz} = \frac{(1 - \tau) \frac{\mu \tau}{\alpha c} \frac{1}{1-\alpha} \frac{(\alpha p z)^{\frac{1}{1-\alpha}}}{\Phi^{\frac{1}{2}}} - (1 - \tau)^{\frac{1}{\alpha}}}{1 + \frac{\alpha}{\frac{1}{\alpha}} \Phi^{\frac{1}{2}} - \frac{\mu \tau}{\alpha c} (1 - \tau) (\alpha p z)^{\frac{1}{1-\alpha}}} \frac{1}{1-\alpha} \Phi^{\frac{1}{2} - 2}.
\]
Therefore, given \(\Phi \geq (1 - \tau)\), for \(\frac{d\Phi}{dz} \leq 0\), it is enough to show that the denominator of the previous equation is negative. That is,
\[
\frac{1}{\alpha} \Phi^{\frac{1}{2}} - \frac{\mu \tau}{\alpha c} (1 - \tau) (\alpha p z)^{\frac{1}{1-\alpha}} \leq 0 \iff c \leq \frac{\mu \tau}{\alpha} (1 - \tau) (\alpha p z)^{\frac{1}{1-\alpha}} - \frac{1 - \alpha}{1 + \alpha} \Phi^{-2}
\]
Since \(c \leq \frac{\mu \tau}{\alpha} [(1 - \tau) - (1 - \tau)^{\frac{1}{2}}] (\alpha p z)^{\frac{1}{1-\alpha}}\), it is enough to show that
\[
1 - (1 - \tau)^{\frac{1}{2}} \leq \frac{1 - \alpha}{1 + \alpha},
\]
which follows from Assumption 2.

A.3 Proof of Lemma 4

Notice that \(\lambda(z) = -\frac{c g(z)}{\mu \tau p N(z)}\). Taking derivatives and reorganizing the terms, one obtains
\[
\frac{d\lambda}{dz}(z) = \frac{1}{N(z)} \frac{c}{\mu \tau p} \left[ \frac{N'(z)}{N(z)} g(z) - g'(z) \right],
\]
If \(\frac{N'(z)}{N(z)} g(z) - g'(z) \leq 0\), then the assertion is trivial. On the other hand, if \(\frac{N'(z)}{N(z)} g(z) - g'(z) > 0\),
\[
\frac{d\lambda}{dz}(z) \leq \frac{z}{N(z)} [(1 - \tau) - (1 - \tau)^{\frac{1}{2}}] (\alpha p z)^{\frac{1}{1-\alpha}} \left[ \frac{N'(z)}{N(z)} g(z) - g'(z) \right] \leq \gamma \left[ \frac{N'(z)}{N(z)} z g(z) - z g'(z) \right],
\]
where the first inequality follows from \(c \leq \frac{\mu \tau}{\alpha} [(1 - \tau) - (1 - \tau)^{\frac{1}{2}}] (\alpha p z)^{\frac{1}{1-\alpha}}\) for all \(z \in [z_3, z_2]\), while the second follows from \(N(z) \in [(1 - \tau) N^*, N^*] \) for all \(z \in [z_3, z_2]\).\(^{54}\)

\(^{54}\)Recall that \(\gamma \equiv 1 - (1 - \tau)^{\frac{1}{2}}\).
Note that
\[ \frac{N'(z)}{N(z)} = \frac{\alpha p z N(z) - (1 - \tau) \frac{\alpha c}{\mu r} \frac{\alpha}{1 - \alpha} (\alpha p z)^{\frac{1}{1 - \alpha}} \frac{1}{N(z)}}{\frac{1 + \alpha}{\alpha} N(z)^{\frac{1}{1 + \alpha}} - 2 \alpha p z N(z)} < \frac{1}{\rho}. \] (13)

Consequently, by plugging (13) into (12), it is straightforward to verify that
\[ \gamma \leq \rho + z \frac{g'(z)}{g(z)} \gamma \rho \Rightarrow \frac{d\lambda}{dz}(z) \leq g(z). \]

### A.4 Proof of Proposition 3

For \( z \geq z_2 \), the proof is outlined in the text. Hence, if \( z_2 = \hat{z} \), the result follows. Assume \( z_2 > \hat{z} \). For \( z \in [z_3, z_2] \), set \( \phi^o(z) = \hat{\phi}(z) \), \( n^o(z) = \hat{n}(z) \), and \( \lambda^o(z) = \hat{\lambda}(z) \), which satisfy conditions 1., 2., and 5. Moreover, Property 1 and condition 3. imply \( \theta(z) \geq 0 \), thus from 6., I set \( U(z) = 0 \), which agrees with the differential equation in 4. equalized to zero, given \( U(z_3) = 0 \) is the boundary condition. If \( z_3 = \hat{z} \), since \( \hat{\lambda}(z_3) < 0 \), condition 7. is satisfied.

It remains to show that 8. is satisfied. Note that at \( z = z_2 \), both conditions 1. and 2. (with \( \omega = 0 \)) hold with equality, but \( 0 = \frac{d^+ U^o}{dz}(z_2) < \frac{d^+ U^o}{dz}(z_2) \). Hence, at \( z = z_2 \), \( n^o(z) \) and \( \phi^o(z) \) are discontinuous.

If the domain of \( N \) and \( \Phi \) are extended to \([0, N^*]\) and \([1 - \tau, \infty)\), respectively, by following similar steps to the ones in the proof of Lemma 2, one can verify that this system has always two solutions if \( 0 < c < \frac{\mu r}{\alpha} [(1 - \tau) - (1 - \tau)^{\frac{1}{1 - \alpha}}] (\alpha p z)^{\frac{1}{1 - \alpha}} \). Index these solutions by \( l \) and \( h \). At \( z = z_2 \), it is easy to verify that, without lost of generality, \( \hat{n}_l(z_2) < n^o(z_2) < \hat{n}_h(z_2) \), \( \hat{\phi}_l(z_2) < \phi^o(z_2) < \hat{\phi}_h(z_2) \), and \( \hat{\lambda}_l(z_2) < \lambda(z_2) < \hat{\lambda}_h(z_2) \). By restricting the domain of \( N \) and \( \Phi \) to be between \([1 - \tau)N^*, N^*]\), and \([1 - \tau), 1]\), respectively, the solution indexed by \( l \) is lost. Consequently, 8. is satisfied.

Finally, for \( z < z_3 \), given that \( z_3 > \hat{z} \), the proof is similar to the one in Proposition 2 provided that Assumption 3 implies that \( z_3 \leq z_1 \).

### A.5 Working out equation (8)

If \( F(z, n, k_1, ..., k_l) = zn^o \prod_{i=1}^{l} k_i^{\alpha_i} \), expected profits are
\[ pzn^o \prod_{i=1}^{l} k_i^{\alpha_i} - n - \sum_{i=1}^{l} r_i k_i - \tau x - \mu \tau \phi(n, x) \left( pzn^o \prod_{i=1}^{l} k_i^{\alpha_i} - n - \sum_{i=1}^{l} r_i k_i - x \right), \] (14)
By taking the first order condition of (14) with respect to \( k_I \), which is chosen in the last stage of the game, one obtains

\[ k_I = \left( \frac{\alpha_I}{r_I} p z n^{\alpha_I} \prod_{i=1}^{I-1} k_i^{\alpha_i} \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\alpha_I}}. \]

By plugging it back to (14), expected profits can be rewritten as

\[ \zeta(z; p, r_I, \alpha_I) n^{\tilde{\alpha}_I} \prod_{i=1}^{I-1} k_i^{\tilde{\alpha}_i} - n - \sum_{i=1}^{I-1} r_i k_i - \tau x - \mu \tau \varphi(n, x), \]

where \( \tilde{\alpha}_i = \frac{\alpha_i}{\alpha_I} \), and \( \zeta(z; p, r_I, \alpha_I) = \left[ (\frac{\alpha_I}{r_I} p z)^{\frac{\alpha_I}{1-\alpha_I}} - r_I (\frac{1}{r_I})^{\frac{\alpha_I}{1-\alpha_I}} \right] (pz)^{\frac{\alpha_I}{1-\alpha_I}} \)

Proceeding iteratively, one reaches (8). Moreover, if \( z \) is either log-normally or paretian distributed, then also \( \zeta \) is.
B Sensitivity analysis

In this section, I check robustness of the empirical results obtained in Section 7 by varying $\beta$, $\eta$, and $\alpha_o$. In particular, I generate results for $\beta$ equal to 4.13 and 2.49, which are consistent with an average employment of 4 and 10, respectively. I also set $\eta = 0.12$ and $\alpha_o = (1 - \eta) \times 0.64$, which is in line with the calibration by Kitao [2008] in another context.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>$\tau$</th>
<th>$\eta = 0.2$ and $\alpha_o = (1 - \eta) \times 0.6$</th>
<th>$\eta = 0.12$ and $\alpha_o = (1 - \eta) \times 0.64$</th>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
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<td>0.91 1.94 1.83 1.73</td>
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<tr>
<td>0.20</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.30</td>
<td>0.83 1.71 1.61 1.52</td>
<td>0.86 1.76 1.66 1.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\beta =$ 3.07</td>
<td>0.15 0.91 1.95 1.83 1.73</td>
<td>0.92 1.98 1.86 1.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<tr>
<td>0.30</td>
<td>0.83 1.71 1.61 1.52</td>
<td>0.86 1.77 1.67 1.57</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>0.30</td>
<td>0.83 1.71 1.61 1.52</td>
<td>0.86 1.77 1.67 1.57</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Table 5: Results for $\hat{\phi}^o = 0.43$.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>$\tau$</th>
<th>$\eta = 0.2$ and $\alpha_o = (1 - \eta) \times 0.6$</th>
<th>$\eta = 0.12$ and $\alpha_o = (1 - \eta) \times 0.64$</th>
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<tr>
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<td>0.90 1.31 1.27 1.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.30</td>
<td>0.83 1.16 1.13 1.11</td>
<td>0.85 1.20 1.17 1.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\beta =$ 4.13</td>
<td>0.15 0.91 1.34 1.30 1.27</td>
<td>0.92 1.36 1.32 1.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.20</td>
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<tr>
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<td>0.83 1.17 1.14 1.11</td>
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<tr>
<td>$\beta =$ 3.07</td>
<td>0.15 0.91 1.34 1.30 1.27</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.20</td>
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<td>0.86 1.22 1.18 1.15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6: Results for $\hat{\phi}^o = 0.65$.

Table 1 and 2 report the results for $\hat{\phi}^o = 0.43$ and $\hat{\phi}^o = 0.65$, respectively. Notice that results are remarkably robust to variations of $\beta$, but net revenue collected would increase even more for higher values of $\alpha$. 
References


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